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Monir Hossain Moni

Article

The Rise of Small States in the Arabian Gulf: The Case of UAE and Qatar: A Historical Sociology Perspective

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Abstract

Over the past fifty years the impoverished and tribal Arab Gulf states have become some of the most developed and influential political players in the Middle East. These states, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, underwent a program of modernisation starting in the early 2000s which has led to both Abu Dhabi and Doha becoming cultural, economic, and diplomatic hubs of the Arab World and gateways to the Greater Middle East. To understand this transformation, resulting in increased foreign policy and economic power and soft cultural influence, this paper seeks to investigate the historical changes experienced by both the UAE and Qatar following their independence in the 1970s.

I argue that, based on historical sociological analysis, the rise of both UAE and Qatar was an inevitable by-product of several changes. To understand the driving forces behind this phenomenon, this paper suggests a trifold analytical framework which attempts to understand the social, political, and economic dynamics behind this shift. Firstly, on a domestic level, the rise of small states in the Arabian Gulf came about because of ongoing socio-political and socio-economic development, ambitious leadership, and a hybrid concept of state identity. Secondly, regional structural change was brought about through equalisation of rich Gulf States and their neighbours, shifting international power dynamics and the radical (yet devastating) changes in the MENA region over the past 20 years. Lastly, the system level has contributed to this phenomenon by recognising the nature of international politics, including the transition and/or diffusion of power, and accommodating small states' vibrant diplomacy.

Keywords

IR Theories, Small States, Middle East, Historical Sociology, UAE, Qatar

Introduction

Since the creation of the modern Arab Regional System (ARS) after World War II, this is the first time where the small Gulf States occupy this prominent status. In the last seven decades, large and middle size regional powers such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (K.S.A.) were the key actors in the region. But since the early 2000s, small and even micro-states such as the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Qatar have become some of the key players and central actors of this regional system. With the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and their aftermath, both countries have become the most influential players in the region (economically, diplomatically and politically). The Gulf (or the *Khaleeji*) power triangle that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar dominant the region, where the power structure in the region have shifted tremendously.

If there is an affirmative law in international politics, it is the fluctuation of power, which leads to the rise and fall of great powers. Today's superpowers could be tomorrow's sick-man of world order. From the Pharaohs, Persians, Greeks, Romans, to the Islamic empire, through European imperial powers, and recently to the U.S. unipolar domination, the game of power politics of the international system is an infinite cycle of rising and falling. In the modern Middle East, the major regional powers concentrated on countries like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, along with Iran, Turkey, and Israel as non-Arab regional powers. Except for Israel, the large geographic and population size, massive natural resources, significant geopolitical location, and the considerable size of militaries gave these states a relative advantage in the regional balance of power compared with small and 'vulnerable' neighbours. In the Arab World too, Egypt was the strongest regional power for more than three decades. Since the mid-1970s, Iraq and Syria shared the domination over the Eastern part of the Arab World until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was the regional hegemon of the area that contains the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) organization and Yemen. Lately, for nearly a decade and half, there were notable evidences refer to the emerging changes and new developments that occur in the region, especially in terms of the traditional regional balance of power and soft power diplomacy. Where the power transit from old regional powers like Egypt, Syria and Libya to the hands of new small rising powers in the Gulf region, in particular the UAE and Qatar.

These transformations include the retreat of classical regional (Arab) powers, due to the fundamental changes in the distribution of power among Arab countries, the accumulation of oil revenues, the completion of nation-building process in the Gulf States, the increasing regional influence of Iran, the changing balance of power in favor of the Gulf Arab States especially Saudi Arabia. As well as

the enormous flourishing of *Khaleeji* economic development, cultural inspiration, strategic ambition, changing political identities, and the increasing of political and diplomatic leverage of the Gulf monarchies.

Perhaps the most important pillar of the Emirati and Qatari rising is their financial and economic capabilities, which are inevitable outcomes of the accumulation of oil revenues that associated manufacturing industries during the past four decades. These two countries succeeded in reinventing their posture by investing and employing their wealth in establishing durable economic and development base, which became the foundation of their economic, political, and diplomatic strength. The second pillar is stability, which contributed to the resilience of political regimes and improves the concentration on realizing economic, social, and political development that relies on the achievement of social justice, welfare, respect citizens' rights, and securing their basic needs. The third pillar is the multilateral dynamic diplomacy approach. Both countries declare their firm commitment of constructive interaction with other countries, abide by the rules of international law, support the rights of other nations, promote multilateralism through international organizations such as the United Nations and the Arab Leagues. Likewise, concentrate on cultural activities, robust participation in the peacekeeping missions, humanitarian activities, development aids, and promoting international dialogue.

Apparently, these approaches improve the UAE's and Qatar's images and inspired them engage further in international activities. Both UAE and Qatar have succeeded in proper exploitation and reinvestments of their national (economic and political) capabilities to construct their foreign policies and using it to expand their global weight. In fact, small Arab Gulf countries re-emphasised the assumption that internal stability strengthening the influence and engagement on the international arena (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989). These pillars are manifested in three fundamental facets, economically, politically and culturally. As a result, Abu Dhabi and Doha have become the political, diplomatic, economic and cultural gravity centers of the Arab World and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since the early 2000s. This radical change in the regional power dynamics still overlooked by most of the region's experts and not been investigated systematically or in depth.

Research Questions

This paper has two main aspects, theoretical and practical. On the theoretical level, it tries to illuminate and decrypt to what extent does the recent literature of theories of International Relations (IR), and Middle East studies succeed in addressing the phenomenon of the rise of non-Western 'Small States'? Likewise, it inquires what are the political domestic conditions can drive small states to adopt

expansionist foreign policy?

On the practical level, the paper inquires and investigates the genesis of historical process and trends that made the Arab-Gulf countries the most powerful and influential actors in contemporary Arab politics. What are the main constituents of the increasing power of small Arab-Gulf states? What are the nature and the forms of domestic and external change that artefact the process of growing of the external influence of the small Arab Gulf states?

Scholars of IR and Middle Eastern studies should seek to offer an answer to these questions for many reasons. Theoretically, these questions are seeking to investigate and examine whether theories such as change theory in international relations, soft power, role theory, and others have had success in explaining the phenomenon of the rise of (non-western) small powers in the international system. It is necessary to expand the scope of investigation to provide a rigorous analysis of this phenomenon. Practically, these questions challenge dominant discourses and literature on the overwhelming impact of the power structure, balance of power, changing security architecture, and political dynamics in the Middle East. Moreover, these questions address the recent developments in the region by refuting and criticizing the neorealist-neoliberal dichotomy of the role of small states, power relations and the foreign policy of the Arab Gulf Countries apart from the political economy of oil, security and power politics relational. Likewise, the identities, interests, and behaviours of the rising powers in the Middle East are still under-researched. Therefore, this paper tries to navigate and uncover historical, sociopolitical and socioeconomic trajectories of the increasing influence of Small Arab Gulf countries, whilst elucidating how they have become the most powerful actors in the region over the last four decades.

The Argument

Most of IR theories had failed to address the trends and forms of change in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, this study argues that the main reason for these changes finds its roots in the process of not only power shift that occurred in the region since the Iraq War of 2003, and the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings of 2011. Instead, it argues that the origins of these changes are fundamentally lying on several sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformations that have taken place within the Gulf region since the early 2000s.

As the foreign trade exchange, diplomatic relations, international engagement and intervention tendencies of the UAE and Qatar grow, so does their political role and obligations to maintain peace and stability of their neighbourhood and beyond. These small states have been known for their policies of international institutionalism, constructive engagement, and belief in the achievement

of peace through multilateral dialogue within the respective international institutions, most notably the United Nations (Al-Mashat, 2010). The ascension of the significance of the UAE and Qatar in the global economy is further underline by the fact that these are Arabic and Islamic countries with modern institutions and therefore are well placed to be key players between the East and the West.

The paper concerns on investigating the process of socioeconomic and sociopolitical transformation, which allows these newborn, tribal, and underdeveloped city-states to become vibrant economies, some of the most powerful actors in the Middle East, and vital stockholders of the international economic system in less than fifty years. The paper concentrates on examining the impacts of nation-building and formation process, capacity-building measures, power shifting and transition (domestically and regionally), the correlation between social and political mobilization and the growth of external power and influence of small states.

The emerging power of the GCC countries, notably the UAE and Qatar, synchronizes with the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of the rest of the classical regional powers. The growing political and economic power and influence of these small countries is a product of increasing economic growth that was achieved by the oil high prices and the resilience of political and social systems of these countries reflected in a constant increasing level of stability, public satisfaction, confidence and content with the performance of the governments. Likewise, it was a product of the process of dynamic economic development, regional megaprojects, and tremendous foreign direct investment (FDI). Furthermore, the proliferation of political and diplomatic activities these states enjoyed finds its roots in their abilities to anticipate the instability in the region, which have led to expansion of their external involvement in regional crises and disputes, as well as successes in managing and resolving some of the region's recent conflicts. The growing significance of the small states in the Arab Gulf region further lies in the diversity of their economic prosperity continues to attract. These countries have become hubs for different cultures and people of diverse backgrounds. Bringing these groups together is nevertheless a considerable task. Both UAE and Qatar have been able to hold the internal affairs sound and secured so far. Nevertheless, one of the main concerns of this paper is to examine how can the UAE and Qatar keep external factors, as well as internal affairs under control, and how they consolidate their power and external influence?

All these reasons compel to assume that, in the first half of the twenty-first century, the small states of the GCC organization will have the upper hand in determining the future's course of the Middle East (Abdullah, 2012). Foreseeably, the events of the Arab uprisings, the deterioration of the situation in both Egypt and Syria, the disintegration of Iraq under the yoke of occupation and Iran's dominance, dealt to the Arab political arena blow and created a tremendous regional

power shift and strategic vacuum in the MENA region. The pattern of external attitudes of both the UAE and Qatar since 2011 show their intention and determination to fill that vacuum and lead the region.

To understand the changing status and the foreign policies of both the UAE and Qatar, the paper will substantially concentrate on the interplay between material and ideational variables of small states' foreign policy and external role. The increasing external influence, the assertiveness of their foreign policies, regional power projection and expansion of both the UAE and Qatar were artefact by the dialectic relations between ideational and material variables. The material variables include the process of nation-building, state formation, institution capacities, power-structure, authority building, social mobilization, economic diversification and the transformation from oil-based economy to knowledge-based economy (or from a rentier state into post/new rentier state), while the ideational variables include the role of identity, norms and other non-material factors; e.g., branding, soft power and cultural diplomacy. Simultaneously, the study will take in consideration the interlaced role of domestic-international nexus and the impact of the complexity of international political/economic structure, the balance of power consideration, and the distribution of capabilities over the development of small states' foreign policy.

Literature Review

Traditionally, the International Relations (IR) discipline is known for being "Big States" field with substantial attention to the great powers which are considered to be the most significant actors in international politics (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). The vast majority of the mainstream theoretical literature (Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism) revolves around great power politics; i.e., security strategies, diplomatic and foreign relations of the great powers, how they behave, move, interact, etc. Surprisingly, even though the majority of the international system (two-thirds of 193 members of the United Nations) could be classified as small states, these actors have been intentionally neglected and pushed out the mainstream of theoretical debate within and between the three dominant schools of thought in the field of IR (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: p. 3). In order to fill this gap, this study tries to bring the small states back-in the debate on the change process, the changing nature of power, and the study of international politics in the 21st century. Because of the limit of space, this section excludes the ongoing debate on small states in theory and practice. Instead of that, the paper will concentrate on the case study of certain small states that are still outside the Eurocentric and Western IR theories' interests.

The main purpose of this paper is to identify what is missing in the debate on small states in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf regions. Notably, most of the

recent literature on the Arabian/Persian Gulf region has focused on the pillars and facets of the growing regional influence. This paper will not engage in this debate, which starts from the assumption that the emerging power of smaller states such as the UAE and Qatar is a pre-given fact. It does not question or investigate the roots of this power or how it had been constructed, developed and manifested in the domestic, regional and international levels simultaneously. Instead, this paper seeks to address this lacuna and present different perspective by exploring and navigating the origins of the vibrant diplomacy, assertive foreign policy orientations and power projection (military, economic and cultural) schemes of the small Gulf States in the last two decades. Moreover, outlines mystification and ambiguity of how small states' power, actions, and identities have been constructed which is still under-studied and neglected topic within the field of Middle Eastern and Gulf studies. Via the lens of historical sociology, this paper will explore how small states construct their practice and power.

As mentioned earlier, due to the overlapping nature of this topic, the literature review will concentrate on two main strands that deal with this subject, highlighting the case study of both the UAE and Qatar.

International Relations theories and Small States

Apparently, many International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA) scholars believe that the study of small states' foreign policy is important for two main reasons. According to the first one, they allow to draw lessons for foreign policy analysis and international relations in general and provide potential for enormous intellectual payoffs for international relations and foreign policy analysis (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017; Elman, 1995). Due to their unique characteristics, the study of small states is crucial for understanding the changing nature of power and dynamics of interaction in modern world politics in general, and in the Global South in particular. According to Thorhallsson and Steinsson, in the field of international relations, small states are considered a unique phenomenon for many reasons, 1) they have unique vulnerabilities, 2) they have different needs, 3) they adopt different foreign policies, 4) and they have a harder time achieving favourable foreign policy outcomes (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017; p. 1).

When discussing small states, most academics stress the smallness and shortage of resources and capabilities, which are considered to be outcome of the size of population, territory, economy, and military, which in turn determine power and influence of any certain actor in the international community. Small states refer to as "member states of the United Nations (UN) [that] have a population of under 10 million" (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017: p. 1). Others regard states with 15 to 30 million inhabitants as small. Likewise, other studies, in a pasteurized manner, define small states simply by differentiating them away from other

larger units such as great powers or middle powers in terms of influence on the international system at any given time (Handel, 1981).

The correlation between the state's size and its capabilities or aggregation of power (the total quantity of resources and capabilities that can be employed) is not inevitable. Being small does not necessary mean being weak. Some of the states that have been categorized as small have different sources of national capabilities that could translate into power advantages and inflate their influence, if geostrategic significance or/and wealth of resources. According to Thorhallsson and Steinsson, these characteristics could compensate for other disadvantages. They argue that:

"Studies of influential small states indicate that they are able to develop issuespecific power to make up for what they lack in aggregate structural power. Small states can, therefore, develop power disproportionate relative to their size on the few issues of utmost importance to them." (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017: p. 2)

It is obvious that the 'realist' approaches, which concentrate on the fact of the physical size as the determination for defining and measuring small states' power, are outdated (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017: p. 3). In order to overcome this predicament, Thorhallsson suggests a framework that claims that the size of states can be identified either through:

- 1. Sovereignty size (the degree to which a state controls its internal affairs and borders and is recognized);
- 2. Political size (which measured based on the state's military and administrative capabilities, domestic cohesion, and foreign policy consensus);
- 3. Economic size (measured by the state's GDP, market size, and development level);
- 4. Perceptual size (or how a state is perceived by internal or external actors); and
- Preference size, which encloses the ideas, ambitions, and priorities of the domestic elites regarding their role in the international system (Thorhallsson, 2006: p. 8).

It is common knowledge to claim that in term of hard power (military in particular) small states, especially the newly independent, are weak and vulnerable to external coercion. Given the smallness of their economic and human capabilities, diplomatic forces and institutional leanness, small states are unable to mobilize large numbers of forces, and therefore invest less in military technology and sustain (or even launch) military campaigns for a longer time. These other constraints

reduce its influence and make them less attractive allies (coalition-partners) as they do not have large foreign policy apparatuses (Panke, 2010). Nevertheless, small states have their own capabilities and power sources. For example, a number of studies emphasise the role of neutrality as a source of power for small states. Likewise, promoting perception and image-building of being peaceful and coalition-building can enhance the power of small states as being entrusted in neutral and as being non-threatening states (Karsh, 1988). Moreover, in order to evade the lack of material capabilities and weak aggregate structural power, and in contrast to neorealist instistance on states pragmatically seek to achieve mainly material benefits, small states' pursuit ideational objectives too. Studies show that insufficient power capabilities do not inhibit small states from seeking "status" just as their larger counterparts do (Wohlforth, 2015). One of the means to do that is by creating normative appeals and relying on international legitimacy and the norms that underline cooperation through diplomatic networks and international organizations such as the United Nations, World Trade Organizations and other frameworks (Pedersen, 1987; Vandenbosch, 1964; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Archer, Bailes and Wivel, 2014; Long, 2017; Narlikar, 2011).

Other studies have referred to "soft power" as a tool of power and as a source of success in international politics for any country given the changing nature of power in the international arena (Nye, 1990, 2002, 2004, 2011). Interestingly, in contrast with hard power, soft power is not exclusive to particular states. In fact, any country can develop its own soft power capabilities. Likewise, soft power does not only achieve ideational benefits but material advantages too. Recent studies show that soft power has both economic benefits and diplomatic clout in a variety of issues such as human rights, conflict resolution, mediation, humanitarian, environment and development issues (Ingebritsen, 2002).

Small states can exert influence on world politics by using appropriate strategies in spite of the substantial disadvantage of being small. To overcome the lack of broad aggregate power, small states need to prioritize their efforts by concentrating on issue-specific power, "Through a willingness to direct more resources to specific issues, small states can exert as much or even more influence than large states" (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017: p. 9). Small states need to emphasise certain policy sectors that represent a vital diplomatic and economic importance to their survival, national interests and areas where they can gain direct strategic benefits (Panke, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2000; Habeeb, 1988).

In sum, the unique characteristics of small states compel them to conduct and adopt certain strategic behaviors and tactics. For example, small states prefer to work within a multilateral institutional framework, which reduce the power asymmetry between states, decrease the transaction costs of diplomacy, and impose constraints on large states (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006). Most scholars believe

that small states benefit the most from these organizations. Small states employ these organizations abilities in gathering, analyzing, and disseminating of data, a forum for exchanges of views and decision-making. Likewise, these organizations defining the norms, creating the rules, monitoring and enforcing of rules, settling of disputes, allocating resources and assistance, and deploying forces. Finally, the multilateral nature of these organizations compensates the poor diplomatic outreach of small states and helps them to fill these gaps (Karns and Mingst, 2004).

What is missing in the theoretical debate on small states in international politics in general, and regarding the power of small states in particular? Most of the literature emphasises Eurocentric case studies such as Iceland, (Corgan, 2002; Thorhallsson, 2018) EU and Western experiences overall (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Thorhallsson, 2000). The number of studies on non-Western small states is very modest (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008; Hey, 2003). Likewise, most of the studies that investigate the power of small states begin with completely contradictory assumptions. These studies argue that, due to possession of strategic natural resources and geostrategic significant location, certain small states (such as the Gulf States) have regional and international influence. Other studies focus on suggesting alternative strategies to small countries, which are believed to strengthen the security of these small states and expand their influence in international forums. These kinds of literature assume that through tools and means such as multilateralism, strategic hedging, appeasement, and soft power diplomacy, small states can execute influence in international politics.

Surprisingly, these assumptions neither discuss nor trace the origins of small states building their capabilities, nor the historical and social genesis of state-formation, and capacity-building process per se. Overlooking political transformation that these states have undergone prevent from understanding ways in which small states construct and build-up these capacities. Rather than assuming that these capabilities are pregiven or are de facto variables, the mainstream literature on small states in international politics does not question the socioeconomic and sociopolitical foundations which makes them insignificant to understand the process of change and development of the small state. This will impede the efforts of understanding complexity of international relations of small states and examining the dynamics of the relationship between small and large states, away from the dichotomy of realist security and survival strategies, and the neoliberal emphasis on the functional role of international institutions, international trade, and liberal economic cooperation.

The Small States in the Arabian Gulf

The literature on small states in the Gulf region focuses on three main topics. International politics of the Gulf States, their foreign and security policies, and to which an increasing attention has been paid to the study of growing accumulative power and influence of small Gulf States recently, especially the UAE and Qatar after the outbreak of the Arab Uprising of 2011.

Since the beginning of the 21st century the Arab Gulf region is still neglected or under-researched. According to Onn Winckler, there were "only two books had been written on this country prior to the early 2000s and I doubt if there was any full academic course in any university outside the Gulf on Qatar until recent years" (Winckler, 2015: p. 159). This paper investigates the rise of small states in the Arabian Gulf region, which includes the six-member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) organization, plus Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. This nine-member-order contain five small states (Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Yemen, and Kuwait). Most of the literature deals with these different actors in semi-unified category under the wider umbrella of Middle East studies (Kornay and Dessouki, 2010; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2014), Persian Gulf Studies (Kamrava 2011; Moghaddam, 2009; Gause, 2010), or the GCC umbrella (Legranzi, 2011; Ulrichsen, 2017; Young, 2017). Other studies combined these divergent countries under the umbrella of rentier economies (Ulrichsen, 2016) or oil-based economy societies (Foley, 2010, Ross, 2013). Therefore, as Karen Young correctly pointed out, in order to understand diverse trends in the Gulf States, IR and foreign policy scholars should avoid the common mistake of most of "typology" of the Gulf States based on the false assumption of a shared model of governance, culture, and traditions. (Young, 2017: p. v).

Because of methodological considerations, this paper is not interested in this analytical direction, although the author believes that the Arab Gulf States have many similarities (historically, economically, culturally and socially). On the contrary, the author believes that in spite of these similarities, each Gulf country has its unique historical and developmental experience, where the process of nationbuilding, and foreign policy orientation was basically manufactured and produced individually through distinct socioeconomic and sociopolitical features. Likewise, this literature review, justifiably, had to eliminate cases of other small states in the Gulf region such as Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Bahrain lacks financial and economic capabilities of the UAE and Qatar. As for Kuwait, which is considered to be one of the richest countries in the region and in the world (in term of GDP per capita), it does not share the same vision as the UAE or Qatar, and it also does not adopt same assertive or ambitious foreign policy trend of these two states (Al-Ebraheem, 1984 [2016]). Finally, under the longstanding ruling of Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, the Sultanate of Oman with its moderate finance and economic capabilities kept conducts and adopt genuinely a different foreign policy and strategic choices (neutrality, non-intervention, and reconciliation) than the Abu Dhabi and Doha and the rest of the GCC members (Al-Khalili, 2009).

The Rise of Small Arab Gulf States

Most of the studies on small states in the Arab Gulf Region (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE) focus mainly on the security strategies of survival, oil, the strategic relations with great powers, regional relations, economic cooperation, political economy of oil, and the increasing soft power capabilities (Almezaini and Rickli, 2016; Colombo and Ragab, 2017). The growing influences of the Arab Gulf States attract attention of Gulf experts worldwide. Since 2010, the number of studies that inspect this phenomenon has grown rapidly. Abdulkhaliq Abdullah called this phenomenon "the Gulf Moment" (Abdullah, 2012, 2010), while other scholars saw the enormous impact of these states as the beginning of the so-called "the Gulfization of the Arab World" process (Jones, Porter, and Valeri, 2018). Rory Miller considered these states as global powers in the making (Miller, 2016).

These studies stress the manifestations of the Gulf States rising after the Arab uprisings, especially towards traditional regional powers such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The argument of these studies claims that to protect and preserve their security and economic interests, spread their influence on the regional arena, and consolidate their regional status, the Gulf countries seek to spoil, foil and vanquish these revolutions through tools and means such as foreign aid, military intervention, political manipulation, and economic sanctions. Because of the Arab uprisings, the Gulf countries are facing new kinds of challenges the most threatening ones since the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 (Davidson, 2012). For instance, the popular intifada reached Bahrain and Oman in mid-2011, the Islamic State (IS) rose violently in Syria, Iraq and across the region, and the regional landscape became more chaotic and radicalized. These challenges and threats forced the Gulf countries to reappraise orientations of their foreign policies and approaches of dealing with regional crises and conflict.

The Arab Spring represents a transformative moment in the history of the Arab Gulf States that manifest the growing power of these small states. For instance, many studies investigated consequences of the Arab uprising on the group of six GCC countries (Davidson, 2010, 2012, 2016). Others focus on the way the Arab uprising represents a threat to the Gulf countries (Ulrichsen, 2015; Pollack, 2011). While some studies considered Arab Spring to be an unexpected opportunity to the Gulf countries in exerting dominance and regional hegemony (Althani, 2012), other scholars concluded that the Gulf countries are leading the counter-revolution camp that seek to abort the Arab awakening (Lynch, 2014; Hass and Lesch, 2017). Likewise, some scholars argued that to expand their soft power and enforce their regional influence, the Gulf countries became prominent proponents of the Arab Uprising, namely Qatar and the U.A.E. (Ulrichsen, 2014; Guzansky, 2014).

Furthermore, the experts' attention was attracted by the Gulf policies toward the rise of political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular (Ramadan, 2012; Hamid, 2014), as well as the balance of power dynamics and the regional security architecture (Almezaini and Rickli, 2016; Fürtig, 2014). Last but not least, there is a number of studies focused on investigating the relationships between Egypt, Iran, Turkey on the one hand, and the Arab Gulf countries on the other hand, in the post–revolution period (Mason, 2016, 2014; Fuller, 2014; Yossef and Cerami, 2015; Joyce, 2012; Saikal, 2016).

For instance, in his "Kingdoms of Desert", Rory Miller, chronologically starts from the early 1970s with the creation of newborn small states that coincided with the first wave of oil boom and them taking control of their own fortunes. Miller emphasises on the role of changing prices of oil on the challenges that the Arab Gulf states faced, specifically in terms of using their oil and gas wealth to pursue stability at home and influence abroad (Miller, 2016: p. 1). Miller described the incredible journey of a group of small Arab Gulf countries that was only fifty years ago "had no towns or cities with populations exceeding 15,000," and becoming now "a bustling centre of international commerce and finance, home to state-of-theart infrastructure, major international sporting events, and world-class museums and galleries". Likewise, Miller outlines how these small states have "taken major stakes in prominent companies, prime real estate, top financial institutions, and luxury brands" in Europe, North America and elsewhere (Miller, 2016: pp. 1-2).

The problem with Miller's study (and with majority of studies that discuss the phenomenon of small Gulf States' rise) is its descriptive nature. The book describes features and forms of the Gulf ascension without going into details and discussing how these Khaleeji kingdoms, especially small sheikhdoms such as the UAE and Qatar, have become that most influential regional actors. Likewise, Miller discussed the regional and international manifestations of these kingdoms, but he did not discuss the process of sociopolitical and socioeconomic transformation inside these kingdoms since the oil boom in the 1970s, which is the subject of this paper.

The Case of the UAE & Qatar

Christopher Davidson's "The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival" is one of the few serious empirical and theoretical studies that engage with the process of state formation, the role of social contract, and the influence of socioeconomic development on the survival and the intensity of the UAE. This book discusses the process of historical transformation of a newborn, underdeveloped and pre-modern sheikhdom of the UAE that was established in 1972. Based on fieldwork and archival research, Davidson explores the historical background of the lower Gulf region by emphasising the role of the British Empire in the development of it and

its effects on local systems, oil finding, and geostrategic significance. These factors were the main determinations of the region's position in the international system (Davidson, 2005: pp. 21-25). Davidson also examines the correlation between the capitalist-based structure of Gulf economies and the smooth transition of power after the British withdrawal from the Gulf region, and facilitating the process of independence, and nation-building. For Davidson, the incorporation of capitalist structure within the newborn states made it more functional and helped the new rulers secure their political and social stability (Davidson, 2005: pp. 139-144).

Davidson pointed out the role of traditional social hierarchy and the structures of power in this tribal society. He explored the tactics and methods that the founder of the UAE (Sheikh Zayed Bin Nahyan) employed to assimilate and unite tribes and families together (Davidson, 2005: pp. 97-102). Another critical issue discussed by Davidson was the economic dependency of a small, desert and arid state such as the UAE. He showed that despite its massive wealth, the UAE tried to transform its economy 0il-based into more diversified model, from consumption to production. This was a possible thanks to the petrodollar revenues of the oil and with a goal of improving its long-term position. The UAE governments traditionally encouraged the transmission and internal substitution of foreign technologies to overcome what Davidson called "internal pathologies" and the challenges this process confronted (Davidson, 2005: pp. 262-266).

Overall, this book presents one of the most rigorous and comprehensive analytical frameworks on the process of state formation, authority building and regime development of the UAE. This framework can provide valuable insights for our study, especially with regards on the dialectical relations between socioeconomic structure, the development of state-building process and strategies of survival employed by small states.

Qatar is considered to be the most rentier state in the world with the highest GDP per capita and the lowest national population in the MENA region. The study of Qatar has started to get more attention since the early 2000s. The discovery of massive reserves of liquid natural gas (LNG), and the new technology which allowed gas to be liquefied and exported in tanker ships made Qatar into one of the top worldwide exporters of Gas. This leads Qatar to increase its influence as a vital member of OPEC organization, consolidating its relations with great powers and enhancing its international status.

Before the discovery of LNG, like any other small states in the region, Qatar was rarely on the radar of international political research and academic agenda. Since the mid-1990s, and particularly after the establishment of the state-owned gigantic media network 'Al-Jazeera' in 1996, which has become one of the most influential tools of Qatar's regional and international 'soff' power, Qatar has started

to get more attention from both academic and business circles all over the globe.

In his "Qatar: Small States: Big Politics", Mehran Kamrava seeks to answer the question of "how can a small state, with a little previous history of diplomatic engagement regionally or globally, have emerged as such an influential and significant player in shaping unfolding events across the Middle East and elsewhere?" (Kamrava, 2013: p. 1) To do so, Kamrava outlines the manifestations of Doha's power and external influence as an emergent small power based on what he calls "subtle power" of small states (chapter 2). For Kamrava, there are three main fundamental changes which are considered to be the constitutive origins of Qatar's rise. The first is the steady shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East with the diffusion and transition of power from countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria toward the Gulf countries. The second is the changing nature of power in the international arena: where the hard/traditional forms of power are not the only means of success in international politics anymore, and where soft and smart forms of power (especially what Kamrava calls 'subtle power' that rests mainly on a "highly visible position of centrality") are gradually considered to be vital means of reaching desired objectives (Kamrava, 2013: p. 12). The third change is the strong relationship between state and society in Qatar, where the ruling family employs enormous revenues of oil to increase community loyalty, reduce political opposition, reinforce national identity, and obtain community support for ambitious development projects and economic transformation plans (Kamrava, 2013 pp. 10-12).

Methodologically speaking, Kamrava's book seems very descriptive and lacks to rigorous and substantive theoretical and empirical analysis in comparison with Davidson's on the UAE. In contrast with Davidson, who presents insightful analysis of the transformations in the UAE, Kamrava does not engage or navigate the genesis of sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes of Qatar that make such micro-states "quickly become one of the most consequential and influential actors in the region" (Kamrava, 2013: p. 1) and successfully adopt "big politics" strategies.

How to Study Small States: A Historical Sociology perspective

The paper mainly concerns on measuring the nature and forms of change within small states by emphasising such features as state formulation process, authority building mechanism, state-society relations, state-capacity and institutional development, etc. On the regional level, it investigates the role and impacts of power dynamics, the rise and fall of regional power in the Arab World, war, identity formation processes, evolving institutional structure of the region and ways in which it relates to the case of small Arab Gulf States.

In order to understand the rise of small states in the Arab Gulf region as a form

of change, this paper claims that Historical Sociology (HS) as the main methodological framework (Hobson, 1998). Basically, HS refers to "a subfield of sociology studying the structures and processes that have shaped important features of the modern world, including the development of the rational bureaucratic state, the emergence of capitalism, international institutions and trade, transnational forces, revolutions, and warfare" (Pula and Stivachtis, 2017: p. 1). According to Fred Halliday, HS mostly investigates "the core components of a political and social order, state, ideology, and society, and focuses specifically on how institutions, be they political or social/religious power, are established and maintained" (Halliday, 2005: p. 36). These institutions include coercion, disciplinary and appropriation institutions that had been established in the modern times and the role and impacts of both domestic variables such as ever-changing, non-state social forces and systemic variables such as global structures of power and imperial/capitalist competition (Halliday, 2005: pp. 72-73).

Basically, HS is an attempt to pave the way for greater engagement between IR and sociology, since the central core of this subfield aims to understand large-scale historical change and identify transformative moments that reshaped social structures and institutions and revealed hidden social structures that frustrated or advanced human aspirations (Pula and Stivachtis, 2017: pp. 1-2). Unfortunately, most of the HS studies emphasis on system and sub-system level of analysis and less attention had been given to the study of small states or individual cases. Within the field of international relations, the relevance of HS has been disputed due to the underestimation of the importance of history and historical analysis in this filed. IR theories consider history as superfluous or exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline (Pula and Stivachtis, 2017: p. 3).

In general, mainstream IR theorists employ an "instrumentalist" approach of history, where they only used it as a tool to confirm theories of the present, not to rethink the present (Rosecrance, 1973; Cox, 1986; Barnett, 2002). In contrast to this instrumental and functionalist use of history, historical sociologists such as John Hobson called for a "constitutive" reading of history. According to Hobson, the constitutive reading of history "examine[s] history not simply for its own sake or to tell us more about the past, nor simply as a means to confirm theorising of the present, but rather as a means to rethink theories and problematise the analysis of the present, and thereby to reconfigure the international relations research agenda" (Hobson, 2002, p. 5).

Neorealists either assume that history is repetitive nothing ever changes because of the timeless presence of anarchy (Waltz, 1979) or that history takes on the form of repetitive great power/hegemonic cycles, each phase of which is essentially identical, with the only difference of great power either rising or declining (Gilpin, 1981). Consequently, neorealists either assert that world politics has

always been governed by timeless and constant logic of anarchy or argue that balance of power politics has been practiced for over millennia (Waltz, 1986, p. 341; Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth, 2007). As Waltz claimed, the utility of historical-sociological inquiry is dismissed (Waltz, 1979, pp. 43–49).

From HS perspective, mainstream IR theories appear to be caught within two modes of ahistoricism: "chronofetishism" and "tempocentrism". According to Hobson, chronofetishism represents the assumption that the present can be adequately explained only by examining the present (Hobson, 2002: p. 6). In sum, by presenting international history as a static entity that operates according to a constant and timeless logic, tempocentricism ignores the fact that there has not been one international system but many, all of which are quite different. Likewise, the HS declines the neoliberals' perspective on the process of change and state formation in international system. Neoliberals believe that historical progression has occurred from a world divided into states to the one in which the non-state (transnational) has become significant, and that change and growth in the international system over time can be characterized as a linear process over time (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane 1989). As proponents of critical school, historical sociologists argue that neoliberal assumptions reflect the Anglo-Saxon assumption and Eurocentric experience intentionally neglecting and overlooking other forms of organizations, governance, development, and administration produced by other communities and nations outside the West (Halliday, 2005; 255-257).

With regard to constructivism, and despite the similarities with HS, there are a number of differences between HS and constructivist approaches. Many historical sociologists believe that constructivism tends to swap external, imposed categories from the vantage point of regional actors. Moreover, constructivism deliberately overlooks the role and impacts of material factors in favor of ideational and normative factors. For historical sociologists, when it comes to the Middle East, constructivism is considered to be old-fashioned deception and a self-delusional analytical frame (Halliday, 2005: pp. 32-33).

The main questions HS are related to political power, state formation process, social change and improvement of human conditions by unmaking and remaking human institutions that play a crucial role within societies since industrialization in 18th and 19th centuries Europe (Gellner, 1988; Elias, 1994). Further, HS challenges assumptions of linear development of history and the interpretation of modernity as an evolutionary process with roots in Western Europe. Moreover, it questions the validity of noncritical theorizing of structures of power organized around such conceptual and analytical categories such as class, gender, race, and completely neglecting the concept of the state (Skocpol, 1979; Moore, 1966; Tilly, 1975, 1978, 1981; Wallerstein, 1974). In contrast, the HS understand modernity, the rise of the modern state and other events, as a product of transformative his-

torical events such as wars, revolutions, and structures of social inequality, or what Charles Tilly called "big structures, long processes, huge comparisons" (Polanyi, 1957; Tilly, 1984).

Historical Sociology and the rise of Small Arab Gulf States

Historical sociology perspective, as a co-constitution of the inter/trans-national and the state levels, that traces the impact of long-term macro transformations, path-dependency, variegated regime types (Hinnebusch, 2013: p. 137), could help us illuminate the parameters of the state formation process, and authority-building paths leading to the rise of small states in the Arab Gulf region. Given the fact that states in the Middle East are operating in "a quasi-autonomous fashion" (Hurd, 2005: p. 245), it makes the analysis of Middle Eastern politics into a convoluted process. Fred Halliday suggests that HS provides an analytical framework that could "combine an awareness of that margin of independence... in the face of all theories of total foreign control of events, with a study of the factors that do constrain and shape a state's foreign policy" (Halliday, 2005: p. 43).

In contrast with the widely accepted presumption of "the ruler decides" model of understanding the policies of Arab and Gulf states, historical sociologists believe it is a false argument. They argue that the leaders of Middle Eastern countries operate within a variety of domestic and external restrictions such as bureaucratic interests, public opinion, state capacity (including economic, demographic, and geographic factors), norms (nationalism, revolution, Islamism), and a more developed, prosperous aggressive external world (Halliday, 2005: pp. 69-70). For instance, analyzing the Middle Eastern states and societies through historical sociology, Fred Halliday emphasises four main analytic frames, which include military conflict, modern ideologies, transnational actors, and international political economy (Halliday; 2005: 197-302). Others, like Raymond Hinnebusch and Adham Saouli, believe that the status of small states of the Arab Gulf (and almost all members of the Arab Regional system) can be explained and understood by the context and process of state formation and state-capacity building (Saouli, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2015, 2010).

Hinnebusch argued that state's status pathways in the Middle East are mainly a product of how state-builders address three fundamental challenges: nation-building, economic development and authority building (Hinnebusch, 2010: p. 201). These strategies were shaped through negotiation of environmental opportunities and pressures on the domestic level (balance of class power, wealth, political culture), on the regional level (war, oil, ideology, identity), and on the international level (international structure, deepening globalization). According to Hinnebusch, the outcomes of these strategies depend on sufficient congruence of a regime's strategy with its environment incentives, and/or the ability to resist

its restraints (Hinnebusch, 2010: p. 201).

Hinnebusch claimed that to understand the process of state formation, building state-capacity and power transition it is important to understand the process of nation-building and regime types in the Middle East and the Gulf region and to illuminate the dialectical relations between identity and territory, which could enhance or inhibit unity and seize legitimacy. In the Middle East, there was a prevalent incongruence between territory (state) and identity (nation) or between norms of sovereignty (sub-state) and the norms of supra-state identities; i.e., Islam and Arabism; the *Dawla* [state] and the *Umma* [nation] (Eyadat, Corrao, and Hashas, 2018; Al-Barghouti, 2008; Tibi, 2009; Ayubi, 1995; Zubaida, 1989). The balance between these ideological regimes has affected state cohesion, integration, and determined policies and strategic outcomes through the last six decades (Hinnebusch, 2010: p. 200; Barnett, 1995, 1993).

In order to understand and analyze the process of change in the international system, HS gives great attention to the process of state formation. For the Middle Eastern case, historical sociologists stress the role of external forces and internal developments factors such as imperial competition, colonialism, the creation of modern state institutions, forging of national identity, secularization process, and the emergence of ideological movements after the end of the First World War (Halliday, 2005: pp. 79-82; Buzan, and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009). Historical records show that the rise of the modern state (even in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf regions) involves the process of producing and the promoting of ideology, nationalism, legitimization of this division (Halliday, 2005: p. 257). Consequently, historical sociologists are perspicacious in asserting this argument as a springboard for advancing our understanding of change processes in the Middle East, and the rise of the small Arab Gulf States, respectively.

Future studies should emphasise the connection between porous boundaries of state-society relations and the persistent of structural power factors; e.g., global financial system, balance of power, climate of ideas, and the character of technology for both state and non-state actors. For example, Hurd suggests broadening the framework of analysis to encompass the discussion on traditional and modern methods of governance, the ability to understand the transformation in the Middle East in will augmentative (Hurd, 2005). This kind of studies could enhance our understanding of how small states such as the UAE and Qatar look at their relations with larger neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to each other. While the narrow lens of realist-neoliberal dichotomy of national interests, security considerations, balance of power calculations, and economic interdependence, HS analysis emphasise deconstruction of the tribal, religious, ethnic and communal genesis of these states, and ways in which these variables effect the process of state-formation, boundaries-making, foreign policy and interestate relations. After

all the Arab Gulf states, like most of the Middle East countries, are still just "*tribes with national flags*" in the words of Bassam Tibi (Tibi 1997; Ayubi, 1996; Glass, 1990; Khoury and Kostiner, 1990; Ajami, 1991).

A suggested Three-level model

Why (and how) certain small states become strong and emerge as a *power* on international stage, while others do not? Neorealists and neoliberals argue that international politics is an eternal field of struggle and competition between *big* countries, how small states grow such influence over other larger, stronger and more powerful countries? The essence of this paper is to understand the constitutive process of "the rising power of small states in international politics".

This paper interested in understanding the genesis of small states' power in world politics rather than explaining the way small states act in international politics or explaining their power and how they implement it. Therefore, the dilemma this study is trying to deconstruct is: where does the power of small states come from? How is it manifested, produced, and projected? I am interested in the study of the source of power, not its implications, origins not outcomes.


My critique of the IR mainstream theories addressing this problematique emphasises not only the absence of questioning the origins of power of small [Arab Gulf] states, but also explores how do we know what we think we know about these small states? Historical Sociology, especially John Hobson and Stephen Hobden works on neorealism and neoliberalism, suggests that traditional IR theories construct our mind and knowledge of IR phenomenon (Hobden and Hobson, 2002; Hobson, 1998). With all its fallacies and shortcomings (e.g., chronofetishism and tempocentrism) that had been based on the Western experience and understanding of international political dynamics (Hobson, 2002: pp. 6-15). Annette Barker's classic study on "The Power of Small States" [1959] and Matthias Maass's "Small States in World Politics" [2017] reflect the most obvious (and dominant) examples of this fallacy. If the case studies of these works were small states in Africa, Latin America, Asia or the Middle East, with all historical and colonial experiences of these regions and societies, the results and findings of such studies be the same? Clearly, the answer is no.

Nevertheless, despite the attractiveness and promise of such argument and the critique of IR theory it offers, this kind of questions and inquiries are outside the scope of this paper. What this paper is trying to investigate is how and why certain small states become strong and powerful?

If IR scholars understand how the power of small states is established, they can explain the way the small states act in world politics, shape their foreign policies. However, how to modify the theories that deal with the actions and foreign

policies of small states, and states in general. To dissolve this puzzle, this paper claims that the process of small states' rising in international politics find its roots in a number of variables which are embodied in the three level of analysis; i.e., individual level, state level, and system level (see figure 1). However, it comprises several ideational and material variables, which are usually being neglected or/and overlooked. These variables do not encompass traditional realist and neoliberal material sources of power, e.g., military power, economic power, natural resources, population size, etc.

Figure 1: The Rise of Small State: Thre Levels Model



Source: The author

Based on the second law of dialectical materialism that predicts that "qualitative changes—in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case—can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion" (Engels, 1987: p. 356), this paper explores the essence of small states' rising process on domestic, regional and international scales (see figure 2).


Figure 2: Materialist Dialects of Change



Apparently, the relationships between these levels are overlapping, interconnected and cannot be separated. A full understanding of the phenomenon of small states' rising should incorporate an understanding of the dialectic of interconnectivity and mutual influence of these variables and indicators, and how they constitute and affect each other. The variables of these three levels of analysis (as inputs) play a crucial role in the process of small states rising (the outputs) through their interactions and the relational dynamics within the surrounding domestic and external environments (see figure 3). On the individuals' level (or the leadership level), variables such as legitimacy challenges, leadership style and persona, strategic choices, learning, authority building, and leadership identity are crucial elements to understanding of the micro-foundations of the process of small states' rising. On the state level, a number of variables play an essential role in formulating and constituting the rise of small states. These variables include regime type, power structure, national ambitions, the level of development, soft power, the level of modernization, state-society relations, domestic social ruling alliance, social mobilization, institution capacity and professionalism, foreign aid, economic liberalism and clear definition of national interests, objectives, and vision. Finally, on the system level, historical context plays a vital role in the process of small states' rising, international structure (polarity), alliance networks, power vacuum, power transition, and the relative power of great and regional powers; i.e., great powers fatigue and exhausting, the retreat of regional powers.

Neorealists and Neoliberals believe that every foreign policy is a product of strategic considerations and geopolitics, where nation-states mainly seek to improve their positions in the region to balance and confront foes and rivals. Despite the fundamental role systemic (structural) variables plays in determining the status and the position of states in international politics, the variables of state and individuals' level of analysis are the most important for understanding the process of small states rising in international politics. Evidently, when it comes to the case of small states, the relation between domestic social forces is the most influential one.

Figure 3: Systematic Process of small states Rise



Several studies argue that assertive, ambitious, and even aggressive, foreign policy

of small states is a result of power change, domestic political struggles, leader-ship personalities and strategic motivations that demonstrate what the leaders are aiming to obtain through adopting certain foreign policy programs (Lawson, 1992: pp. 26-29). Likewise, Robert Gilpin argues that any attempt to measure the change in the international system and how it relates to influence depends on two main variables. First is an extent to which the domestic social structure is efficient. The second is when the profits of national activities start to accumulate and grow in the favour of private sector for the public good interest (Lawson, 1992: p. 30). Gilpin stated that the tendency of a society to seek changes in the international system depends "not only on decreased costs but also on domestic factors that influence the capacity and willingness of a society to pay these costs" (Gilpin, 1981: p. 96).

In the case of the Arab Gulf states, while the UAE and Qatar have not been historically the most efficient regimes (comparing with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) they are the only two [small] regimes that adopt such assertive and ambitious foreign policies. These tendencies are still ambiguous and vague. There are five main types of mobilization and transformations, which took place in the UAE and Qatar in the last four decades and which lead to the rise of these two countries. Similarly, the failure of other small countries in the Gulf region to cope is a result of the insufficiency of these transformations. In contrast with Abu Dhabi and Doha, others small Arab Gulf states failed to address modernization crisis, i.e., economic demands for a big industrial base away from the rentier economy model, establishment of more flexible and efficient administrative apparatuses, and maintenance and strengthening of state-society relationships (public sphere, business elites and civil society). These transformations contain: 1) social mobilisation: transforming from tribe-based society into modernism; 2) economic mobilization: converting from fishing to oil into postoil economy; 3) political mobilization: developing from tribe and ruling family into nation-state; 4) security and defence mobilization: revolutionizing from protection rackets into independence; 5) foreign policy mobilization: moving from dependency to engagement, into leading and primacy, which is a result of high level of professionalism and institutionalisation of foreign policy decision making process (see table 1).

Table 1: Mobilization type in Small Arab Gulf States

Type of mobilization	Details
Social	form tribal-based society into modernism
Economic	from fishing to Oil into post-oil economy.
Political	from Tribe to family, into nation-building.
Security/Defense	from protection rackets into Independence.
Foreign Policy	from dependency to Engaging, into leading and primacy.

29

Source: The author

Conclusion

The foremost objective of this study is to elucidate how in certain periods the strategic situation could be a tool of implementing vibrant and ambitious external activities. The question here is: why the UAE and Qatar succeed in expanding foreign polies despite their small size, while the other small [and larger] Gulf countries fail to act the same? Which social forces are most linked to the Emirati and Qatari external effectiveness, and what are the conditions that create incentives for these social forces to use economic and financial resources as a tool to control and confront their local political rivalries and to strengthen the state's political power? How do these social forces succeed in implementing this polices domestically? Furthermore, the study seeks to provide a conceptual and analytical connection between local political struggles, sociopolitical and sociopolitical mobilization, and the rise and growth of external influence of small Arab Gulf States such as the UAE and Qatar.

Besides HS, and in order to understand the change process in international politics, the paper also suggests using and employing methods such as the case study. In fact, recent studies show that social science starts to move away from variable-centered approach to causality and towards a case-based approach, where case study has become ubiquitous and the most widely used research design in almost every major research program in the field of international relations (Lamont, 2017; John Odell, 2004; Bennett and Elman, 2007: p. 171). According to Brady and Collier, the case study method can establish a variegated set of tools to capture the complexity of social behaviour (Brady and Collier, 2004; Gerring, 2009). John Gerring claims that the epistemological shifts in the field of social science enhanced the attractiveness of the case study format, especially with the retreat of positivism. This retreat tends to underestimate and downplay the importance of causal mechanism in the analysis of causal relations, and the transformation of the debate within social science into investigating the causal inference and the study of the social world (Gerring, 2009; Lamont, 2017).

The aim of using case study method can be justifies by claiming that instead of searching for universal generalizations, this paper applies HS framework to emphasise causal mechanisms, which have varying effects, depending on contexts. The paper will adopt McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's analogy that relying on using "paired comparisons of uncommon cases to find out how recurrent causal mechanisms combine differently with varying initial and environmental conditions to produce radically different outcomes" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: p. 8). The use of case study method could be advantageous for many reasons. It could illuminate causal processes and causal mechanisms, investigate theory testing and the generation of new hypotheses, advance in-depth knowledge of particular events, notions, or practices, and examine the conceptual validity, either through

refining concepts under examination, or creating explanatory typologies (Lamont, 2017; Elman, 2005; Collier and Mahon, 1993).

The Case study method could also help to understand the way in which states (particularly small states) generate, produce, and execute power. Moreover, it could help to explore why in which changes in relative power calculations influence conceptualization of the role of the state within the international system and state's foreign policy choices and international political outcomes (Bennett and Elman, 2007: p. 183). For example, in a different example, Fareed Zakaria attributed the case study of the rise of the United States as an expansionist nationstate, to the development of certain mechanisms that allowed the government to extract and allocate resources for military action in the decades that followed the end of the American civil war in 1865 (Zakaria, 1998: pp. 11-12). The changes of the US behaviour can be indicated and understood through investigate the nature of changes that occurred in the structure and their scope, as well as capacity of the state to develop from a "decentralized, diffuse and divided" state in the 1880s and 1890s into a modern, assertive, and muscular state (Zakaria, 1998: pp. 39-41). Likewise, in the case study of India and its army, Stephen Rosen claims that the differences in social structure identifying people's loyalties, and that "the dominant social structures of a group of people might lead to characteristic strengths and vulnerabilities of each society when making money or making war" (Rosen, 1996: p. 24). Furthermore, such methods could help us understand a dynamic phenomenon such as the rise of small states.

As mentioned above, the paper assumes that the phenomenon of the increasing power of small Arab Gulf states finds its roots in the changing nature of certain ideational variables i.e., identity, norms, institutions, and interests, as much in material variables such as the balance of power, economic development and security considerations. Therefore, the rise of the small Arab Gulf States is a product of the large-scale historical change in the social and institutional structures of both the UAE and Qatari societies.

To elaborate further, in order to expand our understanding and adding value to our knowledge about such phenomenon, future studies should investigate, interrogate and examine various hypotheses; i.e., 1) As the long-term power of the small states increases, the state will increase its external mobilization/extraction. In other words, as the long-term level of modernization and internal mobilization increases, the small state will expand its external extraction and validation; 2) As the nation-building and legitimacy-building process being consensual and socially rooted, the state will pursue external validation and engage in international affairs. Meaning, the more peaceful the state-building process, the more likely small states will focus on adopting external strategies, and vice versa; 3) Ambitious leaders of small states will rely on international strategies to greater

extent than other small states leaders. Conversely, moderate/conservative leaders of small states will rely on domestic strategies to a greater extent than ambitious leaders; 4) There are no direct correlations between small States' possession of natural resources, financial and economic capabilities and the external influence and effective foreign policy. Namely, the possession of strategic and significant natural resources (e.g., oil and gas) does not necessarily guarantee that a small state would be internationally powerful or influential; 5) Domestically strong states will emphasise external strategies more than will domestically weak small states. In other words, as long-term domestic stability increases, the small state will increase its external extraction and allocate resources to engage in the international arena; 6) If national identity is clear and lucidly defined, the small state will adopt an efficient foreign policy. In other words, if the differentiation between the Dawala (the state) and the *Umma* (the nation) is clear, the foreign policy of small states will be unchained and energetic; 7) As the long-term professionalism and institutionalization level of the decision-making process of the small states increases, the external involvement of small states will increase; and last but not least 8) As the greater-scale of large and middle powers' burdens and fatigue increases, the small states will increase their engagement in the regional neighbourhood and in international affairs. In other words, the weaknesses of regional and international powers increase the possibilities of small states' external extraction and allocation of resources for the purpose of engaging in the international arena.

Bio

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Article

The Rising Security Cooperation of Turkey In Africa: An Assessment From The Military Perspective

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Abstract

In a context where many eyes focus on the security and strategic cooperation between Turkey and the official Government of Libya, Ankara's military presence in this country, as much impressive as it may seem, does not reflect their broader partnership that is gradually being established in Africa at large. It is therefore surprising to see that so far no serious mainstream analysis has captured this dimension. This research paper thus answer the question how does Turkey use the security and military approaches to give more volume to its foreign policy towards Africa? At the core of these exchanges lays a network of security and military agreements concluded with more than twenty African countries. This partnership then extends through various training programs and defense industries' cooperation. The Turkish military facility base in Somalia, the first of its kind in "Black Africa", also remains a perfect example of projection and military proactivity in the new grammar of Turkey's foreign policy, and an answer to traditional westerns powers in Africa despite various challenges.

Keywords

Turkey, Africa, Foreign Policy, Security, Military, Cooperation

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey is successfully increasing its presence in Africa. The 2000s played an important part in this as in the aftermath of the so called "Opening policy" of Turkey to Africa in 1998, everything went very quickly. Successively 2005 is marked "Day of Africa in Turkey", while Turkey is officially declared 'strategic partner' of the African Union in 2008. In this dynamic, Turkey's presence in Africa has generally been analyzed through topics such as political and diplomatic partnership, the strengthening of economic and trade cooperation, development and humanitarian assistance cooperation, as well as diversified

cultural partnerships. And yet these aspects alone are not enough to account for the rich content of the partnership between Turkey and Africa, which has continued to diversify, particularly in terms of security and military as reflected in the principle of the multifaceted diplomacy that shaped the new Turkish foreign policy since early 2000s (Davutoğlu 2012). Indeed, while security cooperation was already included in the general report of the first two Turkey-Africa Summits in 2008 and 2014, it can be surprising to see how main stream analyses still fail to capture this new dimension of Turkey's foreign policy in Africa.

It should be noted that the security and military cooperation of Turkey in Africa is a major trend of its foreign policy. This is particularly well underscored in their new partnership in Africa where after a first decade of "opening strategy" to the continent from 1998 to almost 2010, the new approach of their foreign policy as depicted in 2010 under the concept "the strategy in Africa", covers a large contribution of strategic administrations unlike before. This includes the Ministry of external relations, the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, the National Defense Ministry, the Under-secretariat of Defense Industry and the Police General Directorate (Genelge 2010/7).

In order to conduct this research, we relied on the Turkish Official Gazette Drive (Turkish Official Gazette 2019) which confronted us with a methodical and careful selection in the midst of thousands of agreements and the imperative of exegetic and content analysis methods. And for the purposes of an in-depth analysis, the main focus has been put on the military and security agreements, featuring more than twenty African countries. As written in the preambles of those agreements, the military co-operations are based on principles of sovereign equality and mutual benefit between Turkey and its African partners. Many legal instruments operate here including memorandums of understanding (MoUs), contracts, protocols, amendments and other technical arrangements or agreements (Framework Agreement Ethiopia 2006).

This policy paper thus answer the question how does Turkey use the security and military approaches to give more volume to its foreign policy towards Africa? As such, this article aims to highlighting the security, and mainly, the military dimension of Turkey's foreign policy in Africa and the new partnership underpinning this approach. At the core of these exchanges lays a network of security and military agreements concluded with more than twenty African countries (i). It is a cooperation that can be assessed and exemplified through various security training programs (ii). This partnership then extends through cooperation on security and intelligence as well as the promotion of exchanges at the level of military industries (iii). Beyond all this, the security partnership with Libya, and the Turkish military facility base in Somalia (iv), the first Turkish base of its kind in "Black Africa", also remain perfect examples of proactivity in the new grammar

of Turkey's foreign policy of security in Africa.

The framework of security and military agreements between Turkey and Africa

Beyond the issue of training facilities, these agreements reflect the initiative to restructuring relations with African countries sharing with Turkey an old common heritage dating back to the Ottoman Empire as highlighted here by the Protocol Agreement in military history and museology, concluded with Algeria on October 19, 2010, as well as many other countries (Protocole Accord de Coopération Algérie 2010). This also includes participation in scientific research courses organized by both parties and the involvement of experts and specialists in reference areas for training purposes, as well as seminars, conferences, archives or publications in military journals of both parties.

The security and military agreements between Turkey and Africa give rise to diverse arrangements according to the needs expressed by the parties. A very illustrative example in this sense is the helicopter pilots training Agreement with Tunisia concluded in 2012 for a period of one year. Following the terms of that Agreement, the Turkish Republic Land Forces TRADOC Army Aviation School was to provide training for Tunisian Armed Forces members. To that effect, UH-1 helicopter was to be used for field exercises (Flight and Technical Protocol Tunisia 2012).

More recently, taking the case of a country like Libya and in application of the General Framework Agreement between the two parties, a "Logistics Foreign Military Assistance (Donation) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and Libyan Presidency Council" was signed on January 8, 2017. The aim of the Agreement was to "further strengthen the military cooperation, to contribute to the structuring of the Libyan Presidential Guard and to fulfill" their logistic requirements. To put it simply, the purpose was to equip the Libyan presidential guards with high quality uniforms. In that perspective strategic logistic materials were provided including: Battle dress uniform, camouflage, boots (private and summer), caps (new type camouflage, summer), belts, and different types of complete clothing assortments of elite military units (Logistics Agreement Libya 2017).

The military cooperation with Libya is gradually becoming a major lever for the Turkish foreign policy of security, especially since the agreement signed in November 2019 by which Turkey undertakes to guarantee support and stability to the internationally recognized official government of Tripoli. The concretization will be quickly materialized by a decision of the Turkish parliament authorizing the deployment of Ankara military support from January 2020. This is quite interesting because, although Turkey is a member of NATO which, under the

leadership of France and Great Britain organized the collapse of the regime of Colonel Gadhafi, they have always seemed to occupy a secondary role in this issue so far. And Ankara even appeared reluctant with the Western solution of military intervention; and later on we could appreciate the consequences.

However, the remarkable presence of Turkey during the Berlin Conference held on January 19, 2020 over the situation in Libya, with a preponderance of the Ankara-Moscow axis in particular due to their strategic presence in the operational field, is a fundamental fact.

Still in the field of strategic agreements, let's also mention here the Protocol between Turkey and Senegal regarding the opening by Turkish Armed Forces of a Turkish Language Teaching Center in Dakar, signed on July 13, 2011. Together with other existing Yunus Emre Institutes, this will prove to be a tool of high impact in an environment marked by a historical domination of French or English, usually giving priority to traditional partners. It further facilitates the perception of Turkey as a security and military training destination. The table under gives an insight of the security and military agreements concluded by Turkey in Africa so far.

Table: African Countries Linked to Turkey with at Least one Military or Security Agreement

African Countries Linked to Turkey with At Least one Military or Security Agreement				
Field of Cooperation	Countries			
Military Training, Science & Techniques	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tunusia			
Gendarme Training	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya			
Police Training	Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinee Bissau, Niger, Somalia, Tunusia, Uganda			
Defense Industry & Scientifique Cooperation	Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan			

Source: Data compiled by the author from the Turkish Official Gazette 2019

Agreements on military training between Turkey and Africa

Fields of the training

The military agreements here mainly comprise "Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field" between Turkey and dozens of African countries. The agreements are usually concluded for a duration of five years, with an automatic extension of one year each time at the expiration of the initial periodicity, unless a party raises an objection. The analysis of the Framework Agreement with Ghana as signed in 2011 for instance, has the advantage of providing a large and detailed field of the military cooperation between Turkey and its African partners (Framework Agreement Ghana 2011). The article 4 of this Agreement thus includes at least 17 fields of cooperation as followed:

"Cooperation in military training and instruction; Cooperation between military institutions and contact visits; Participation in exercises/training, sending observers to exercises; Cooperation in defense industry; Military cooperation between the Armed Forces; The organizational structure of the Armed Forces; The structure and equipment of military units, personal management; Cooperation in military intelligence; Cooperation in military medicine and health services; Cooperation on communication, electronics and information systems; Cooperation in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and counter piracy operations; Exchange of information on military legal systems; Cooperation in the field of mapping and hydrography; Exchange of personnel for professional development; Cooperation in military scientific and technological research; Social, sportive and cultural activities; Other areas to be agreed upon by the Parties".

The other fields of this military cooperation also include military history, military archives, military publications and museum, military geography; the military science and technology researches. Referring to the scope, it is stated that the agreements shall include the exchange of personnel, material, equipment, information and experience in the various fields of reference, and other fields as may be determined by complementary and implementation agreements, MoUs, protocols, and other arrangements to be signed by the parties in respect of their "General Framework Agreements".

Assessing some cases of Africans' military training in Turkey

African training at the Turkish National Defense University (TNDU)

The Turkish National Defense University is a military higher education institution created in July 2016, in the aftermath of the 15 July military coup defeated by the Turkish people. It is easily understandable that in order to ensure a better control and coordination of the army, several military schools all around the country were closed. Those that remained were all reformed according to the Governmental Order 669 under the title of "Taking Precaution within the State of Emergency and Foundation of National Defense University and some other Amendments", thus founding the National Defense University (Turkish NDU 2019a).

Assuming the huge responsibility of coordinating the military education throughout the national territory the University is structured around 10 institutes includ-

ing war colleges, strategic and engineering institutes as well as Military, Naval and Air Forces Academies. As such the TNDU just like the other Turkish military institutions before it, contributed to the training of African officers and NCOs. Turkish military schools already ensured the training of thousands of African military staffs as I could notice through in-depth analyses and interviews. It is stated that by the end of 2014, 2,200 military personnel from African countries received military training in Turkey. Only in 2017 for instance, 176 African militaries completed their training in Turkey. And for the year 2017-2018, 290 other African were to achieve the same path (TRMFA 2019). Almost 104 African officials from diverse nationalities such as Algeria, Gambia, Senegal and Somalia received their training in the Turkish National Defense University since its creation. Only in 2018, the TNDU received two high level visits from Nigerian and Tanzanian Military schools. The visit from the Nigerian National Defence College was led by the Air Commodore Sunday Olanipekun Makinde on May 24, 2018.

Such visits always prepare the ground for further cooperation and exchanges of know-how. It is noteworthy to underline that the current Somali head of military staff is a former trainee of the Turkish National Defense University, where he graduated in July 2016 from his master's degree after studying staff training, commanding a brigade and army management. For more than seven months, General Odawaa Yusuf Rageh, of his name, has been the commander of the land forces in Somalia, though only aged 32 (Maruf 2019). Besides this, already in 2013, the Turkish Armed Forces provided Language courses and the "Officer Basic Indoctrination Training" to about 200 military from Somalia. Meanwhile, a total of 3,000 Libyan troops divided in groups of 500 received 14 months of training in the field of Internal Security, in the city of Isparta during the academic year 2013-2014 (Sazak & Nazli 2016, p. 13).

African training at the NATO Centre of Excellence-Ankara (NATO-COEDAT)

As written in the COEDAT-NATO Centre's Brochure edition of 2019, Turkey expressed since 2003 the need of creating a 'Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism' (COE-DAT). This is concretized and materialized thanks to a collaboration with 8 NATO countries. By June 2005, the Centre is officially inaugurated and works with many countries and partners on issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism following different models of framework agreements. The COE-DAT thus conducts courses, mobile education and training activities, seminars, and workshops for the members of NATO, and states member of agreements such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Partners Across the Globe (PatG), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), pertinent International Organizations (IOs), and states linked to Turkey by specific bilateral relationship. (COEDAT-NATO Centre, 2019a).

The Centre offers courses like: Defence against Terrorism; Terrorist use of Cyberspace; Defence against Suicide Attack; Critical Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks; Counterterrorism/ Attacking the Network (AtN); Terrorism and Media, to name a few. Since the Centre has made the fight against terrorism his specialty, many African countries entangled in the struggle against terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Al Shabab or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) seize this Turkish opportunity to train their personnel.

African contingents in NATO-COEDAT training courses

Since its opening the COEDAT-NATO Centre in Ankara has received several African delegations, either for a training session, either for an institutional visit preparing further partnerships between Turkey and the visiting African country in the field of terrorism and asymmetric security. Since 2013, the COEDAT received at least 14 high level visits from African military staffs (COEDAT-NATO Centre 2019b).

Only within the period from 2016 to 2019 the Centre received a dozen of Cameroonian high civilian and military staff, ranking from captain and beyond, for diverse training purposes. During the field work related to this policy paper, the author personally had the opportunity to meet and to guide some those delegations. This includes the Cameroonian military delegations partaking to the course 'Defense against Suicide Attack' which took place from the 16 to 20 April 2018. The course was designed for NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Partners across the Globe, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries (ICI), and relevant International Organizations dealing with counterterrorism. African were highly represented during that session. Some were sent directly by their states, and others by security-based regional International Organizations such as the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which we easily understand, is engaged in the fight against the Boko Haram or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 54 participants from 24 countries took part to the training. Among them we had 7 trainees from Africa, including five from Nigeria, one from Cameroon and one from Tunisia.

The specific case of the 'Defense against Terrorism' course training session which took place from the 11th to 15th February 2019, can also be highlighted here, as it brought together high rank African military officers from at least five different nationalities including Cameroon, Senegal, Gambia, Algeria and Tunisia.

Turkey as a rising challenger in the market of defense industries in Africa

As the Turkish Vice-President Fuat Oktay put it, in order to underscore the country's ambitions, capacities and defense capabilities: 'In 2002, we exported defense and aviation industry products worth \$ 248 million, and by 2018, this

figure had risen eightfold to over \$2.035 billion' (Alhas A., 2019). And still this is not yet enough as Turkey keep moving ahead looking up to its ambitions which are not only matters of national development but also national security defense and identity as a nation, and national pride. This was further emphasized at the last IDEF (International Defense and Exhibition Fair) in Istanbul in May 2019, as the head of Turkish 'Defense Industry Presidency' (SSB), Ismail Demir, announced the 20% increase of the defense exports to Turkey thus reaching \$ 2.2 billion over the same period. He stated that in this sector which employs more than 67,000 people, \$ 1.45 billion has been invested on defense research and development in 2018 (El Watan 2019). An upward trend which should further increase in the future. Certainly to open up to new markets and opportunities apart from those to which Ankara traditionally exports. However, the defense market remains dominated by traditional players both globally and at the African level.

Challenging traditional players in defense industry in Africa

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China were the five largest arms exporters in 2014–18; the five weighed 75% of the total volume of arms exports for the said period. The global arms exports is by far dominated by US as seen in the gap between the top two arms-exporting states: 'US exports of major arms were 75% higher than Russia's in 2014–18, while they were only 12% higher in 2009–13' (World Economic Forum 2019). But Russia leads the market of defense furniture in Africa.

In 2014–18 Russia alone represented 49% of total military equipment imports to North Africa, the U.S. for 15%, China for 10%, France for 7.8% and Germany for 7.7%. In the same time, Russia also weighed about 66% of Algerian arms imports (Wezeman et al. 2019, p. 8). The Russian domination extends in sub-Saharan Africa as well where they accounted for 28% of arms exports in 2014–18, while China accounted for 24%, Ukraine for 8.3%, the U.S. for 7.1%, and France for 6.1% (Wezeman et al. 2019, p. 8). This contrasts with 2009–13 period where sub-Saharan Africa had Ukraine as the largest supplier.

As the world's fifth arms exporter, China is gradually also playing a significant part on African defense market, as they rank third in arms exportations behind Russia and the US. Since 2008 China sold 20% of its overall arms production in Africa; which represents a worth of US\$ 3.2 billion, with main importers being from North Africa with Algeria as top customer (China Power Team 2018). Whereas Russia overshadows this African market with arms sales amounting US\$ 14.6 billion since 2008 (mainly to Algeria and Egypt representing 86.6% of acquisitions), followed by the US accounting for \$ 5.6 billion arms exports in Africa (88% of it go to Morocco and Egypt) (China Power Team 2018). On a more

critique view, many international reports established that Chinese arms have been used to fuel conflicts and wage wars in Africa, namely in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia. Besides exporting weapons to a country like Sudan, China even set up and operates three military weapons factories near the capital Khartoum. It is also documented that China supplied the country with Scud missiles, ammunitions, Tanks, helicopters and fighter aircrafts and thus breaching the UN international arms embargo hitting Sudan at that time (Hodzi 2018, p. 174). And yet Turkey is still struggling to attract more partners in this African defense market.

Turkey's deployment in the African defense industries and security market

More than forty years later, since the efforts of transforming its defense industry in the 1970s, Turkey have moved from importers of weapons to exporters. This is evidence that important efforts have been made. With low production costs, Turkey has been exporting its arms to the Middle East, Asia and Europe for several years and has recently committed itself to an offensive on the defense industry market in Africa, through a successful partnership of public and private companies. Especially since Africa occupies a non-negligible position in the world trade and circulation of defense equipment. Thus it is without surprise that the world's five largest arms importers in September 2019 include two African countries, Egypt and Algeria, together with Saudi Arabia, India and Australia (Wezeman et al. 2019, p. 6).

The rising presence of Turkish military technologies and equipment in Africa

As said previously, the Turkish defense industries market is very ambitious. Annual export figure of \$ 3 billion appears quite realistic in the next five years. But apart from Tunisia we could see in 2016 that top market of Turkey's exportations were the United States, providing almost a third of all Turkish exports with \$ 587 million worth business. After US we had Germany (\$185 million), Malaysia (\$99 million), Azerbaijan (\$83 million), Saudi Arabia, Britain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Bekdil 2017).

A SIPRI report between 1980 and 2014 shows at most 5 African countries among the destinations of Turkish military equipment exports, including Tunisia with procurement of \$ 3 million (2014), Rwanda for \$ 5 million (2012), Egypt for \$ 4 and 8 million (2011 and 2012) Nigeria for \$ 8 million (2008) and Libya for \$ 23 and 11 million albeit at an earlier date (1980 and 1981) (Réal-Pinto & Anouck 2017, p. 18). Added to this is the fact that Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are more often seen as part of the Middle East than Africa at large; this further contributes to reduce or to undermine the projections of Turkish military industries in Africa. We therefore understand the significance of a whole issue of a strategic reorientation of Ankara towards Africa, which retains the full potential of being a

niche for its defense industries that are very poorly represented there or even not at all. And so far, the type of material sold in Africa by Turkey includes in majority wheeled armoured vehicles: such as Hundreds of BMC's Kirpi 4x4 patrol vehicle sold to Tunisia or the Otokar's Cobra 4x4 armoured personnel carrier currently in service with Mauritania and Rwanda (Efstathiou & Tom 2019). And still, the competition in this area is quite rude since many companies around the world can offer the same system very easily.

Aselsan the Turkish security and military champion in Africa

Turkey is gradually taking root in the African defense market with the help of companies like Aselsan, which are building various partnerships on the continent. In 2011 the South African branch of Aselsan is established with the aim of developing high end electro-optical systems for airborne military use. Nowadays Aselsan South Africa shapes, "develops and manufactures high performance electro-optical systems for its owner and also for the South African military aerospace and maritime markets" (Martin 2015). In September 2014 for example, in order to further extend its activities, Aselsan-South Africa concluded a MoU with Paramount Group, the largest African defense company. Since then, Aselsan exports to more than 48 countries around the world including South Africa and six other African states.

Despite the presence of American, Russian, Chinese or French companies which, with their efficient and old network on the continent do not facilitate the challenges, Alselsan nevertheless begins to conquer some business opportunities. With strong arguments, notably emphasizing its willingness to share its technology, and also thanks to its outstanding and recognized performances, Aselsan begins to create its way on the continent, particularly with some contracts concluded with Tunisia and Algeria (El Watan 2019). And negotiations in the same direction are underway with Morocco.

Of course, Aselsan is far from being the only Turkish defense company interested to the African market. Other structures such as Roketsan, Nurol Makina or AVS are also gradually active.

The Increase of Turkish military attachés in Africa

Since 2008 we witnessed a tremendous growth of Turkish embassies in Africa, with 42 diplomatic missions hitherto. This trend is almost the same concerning the positions of military attachés. Turkey has indeed considerably increased their number in their embassies in Africa since 2002 as can be seen in the table below. And this is far from being a mere coincidence.

Table: Turkish Missions of Military Attachés in Africa

The Offices of the Military Attaches of the Turkish Armed Forces in Foreign Countries			
No.	Country	Attache	
1	Nigeria	Office of the Military Attaché in Abuja	
2	Ethiopia	Office of the Military Attaché in Addis Ababa	
3	Ghana	Office of the Military Attaché in Accra	
4	Mali	Office of the Military Attaché in Bamako	
5	Algeria	Office of the Military Attaché in Algiers	
6	Djibouti	Office of the Military Attaché in Djibouti	
7	Senegal	Office of the Military Attaché in Dakar	
8	Tanzania	Office of the Military Attaché in Dar El Salam	
9	Sudan	Office of the Military Attaché in Khartoum	
10	Egypt	Office of the Military Attaché in Cario	
11	Uganda	Office of the Military Attaché in Kampala	
12	The Democratic Republic of Congo	Office of the Military Attaché in Kinshasa	
13	Guinea	Office of the Military Attaché in Kinshasa	
14	Somalia	Office of the Armed Forces Attaché in Mogadishu	
15	Kenya	Office of the Armed Forces Attaché in Nairobi	
16	South Africa	Office of the Armed Forces Attaché in Pretoria	
17	Morocco	Office of the Military Attaché in Rabat	
18	Tunusia	Office of the Military Attaché in Tunis	

Source: Turkish Armed Forces 2018, compiled by the author

Out of 72 Turkish military mission attachés in the world, 18 are located in Africa, which represents the ¼ of the total. It just informs on the importance of the continent to Ankara. And it should also be noticed that most of these Mission attaché positions start opening only as from 2002.

In this sequel between Turkey and Africa, it can also be seen that Cooperation Agreements in the fields of security and defense has been revitalized both in their content and in their number. The signing of several agreements in the field of defense industries cooperation between the two parties, thus crystallizing the rooting strategy of Turkish defense industries in Africa is eloquently illustrative in this sense. While there was almost none before, there are more than a dozen of these agreements since the 2000s. These missions of military attachés play a crucial part in promoting Turkey's military technology and doctrine in Africa.

Defense industries' comparative advantages of Turkey in Africa

In general Turkey may benefit significant assets to act as prominent player in the defense industries field in Africa. In fact, given the high sensitive dimension of the military and armament sectors, Africans usually face many obstacles to acquire defense equipment from traditional countries and major powers. This includes obstacles related to various conditionalities such as the "human rights" constraints and the scrutiny right that these powers always maintain on arms imports and circulation of defense equipment in Africa. In such a configuration, the crisis of trust naturally becomes part of the agenda, especially as the traditional powers in this universe of conditionalities proceed with discriminatory supports according to whether the parties are their allies in their politics in Africa and outside or not. Moreover, according to a confidence reporting of African military officials, in many cases it can happen that the acquired weapons from traditional partners are delivered without technical explanation on the modes of assembly, or an after-sales service not optimal. Sometimes cases of purchased weapons with deliveries of bullets not corresponding to their caliber were also reported. Ankara then seems more reliable to those countries.

In this sense, Turkey has a real comparative advantage with military technologies more adapted to Africa's financial resources, anthropology and topography as well. It is a production more adapted to African geographical and climatic subtleties. In consequence, delivering a well proofed NATO equipment at a low cost is therefore part of Ankara's narrative and a strong advertising motto. It should also be highlighted the Ankara's ability to position itself on foreign market segments suffering issues of conditionalities or embargoes from the West, thus undermining the technology transfer as being the case in Africa. Hence the slogan of some Turkish defense industries based on, "Let's develop together", where Western companies limit themselves to "I want to sell to you" (Bekdil 2017).

Military and security cooperation through strategic positioning in Africa and the military facilities in Somalia

While Turkey is already present in Africa in the security field through several agreements as observed, the strengthening of ties with the legal and official government of Tripoli in recent times has constantly captured the attention of Westerners, and particularly Europeans (Le Figaro 2019). The agreements concluded in November 2019 between Ankara and the Government of National Accord (GNA), relating in particular to hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean, and the military support to the forces of the official Government of Libya, illustrate this debate. In one of his interventions, the director of communication of the Turkish presidency, Fahrettin Altun, indicated that this new protocol is in fact a larger version of the framework agreement for military cooperation already existing between the two parties. This is in fact, part of a loyalty process for the various strategic partners of Ankara in Africa, particularly in terms of security. Indeed, this testifies to the ability of Turkey to be able to support its allies beyond mere speech and rhetoric.

The agreement between Turkey and the Sudan for the renovation of Suakin island off the Red Sea facing the Arabian Peninsula is also a major strategic issue.

Turkey's new security and military policy in Africa is further illustrated by the construction of a military facility base in Somalia, making this country a pivotal state in its projection's strategy. this "military facility" with a total investment of more than US \$ 50 million, and whose construction works begin in March 2015, aims as one would naturally expect, to strengthen the operational capacities of the Somali army and to a better stability of the state apparatus. To mark the engagement of Turkey in Somalia, it should be recalled that on June 3, 2016, President Erdogan already inaugurated in the same country the Turkey's largest embassy oversea following the "three-nation East Africa tour" that took him across the Horn of Africa (Aktas & Addis 2016). Turkey already provides Somalia with military aid, education support, infrastructural development and skills training.

 Turkey to open first-ever overseas RECEP TAYYIP
ERDOGAN HOSPITAL military facility in Mogadishu in January The facility is located close to Mogadishu's airport, three MOGADISHU PORT kilometers (1.8 miles) from the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital and MOGADISHU the Mogadishu port The facility will be used to train soldiers from Somalia and other African countries MILITARY EDUCATION FACILITY Construction started in Military school to open in January 2017 SOMALIA ▲ It occupies 400 Military facility The complex houses costs \$50M three military schools dormitories, depots and

Figure: Locating the Turkish military facility base in Somalia

Source: (Aktas & Addis 2016)

Since Turkey's official engagement in Somalia as from 2011 onward, security has always been a top priority. Thus an amount of 20 million Turkish Lira is quickly invested from the very beginning, with a view to restructuring the security and defense forces of this country. And together with the support of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Turkish General Staff and the General Directorate of Security, operational researches were conducted on how to best restructure the Somali defense and police forces.

Thus a specific development assistance strategy was put in place including the building of infrastructures, configuring and training the Somali police. To this

effect, under the coordination of the General Directorate of Security, more than 60 Somali police personnel benefited intense capacity strengthening sessions in Turkey. And such training exercises are repeated quite regularly. It therefore goes without saying that in the near future, Turkey's ability to operate as a security player will be put to the test, along with major players such as the UN, NATO, France, the United Kingdom and the US. And this is an issue of fundamental interest as this new field of cooperation between Turkey and Africa is not without risks and apprehensions unfortunately. This includes for instance the fear of seeing in a close future the reproduction of the same patterns as with criticized traditional partners.

Conclusion: Observations and the way forward

Keeping the eyes on the security and strategic partnership of Turkey in Libya or Somalia prevents from having a full reading of Ankara's foreign policy strategies in Africa. Especially in the security field. Ankara's security involvement in Africa is part of a double approach. First, a catch-up logic since the international with-drawal of Turkish power following the First World War. Then a logic of equalization and rebalancing in the face of traditional powers which seemed to have quickly rethought the world with the "Anatolian power" reduced to the status of neglected appendage.

Through its military training programs towards Africa, Turkey is gradually establishing itself as an alternative player in an environment long dominated by traditional actors. It thus appears clearly that this training dynamics are firmly contributing to introduce and to boost the Turkish military doctrine in Africa. This will certainly play in the near future as decisive factor to the further opening of the African defense market to Turkish technologies and companies in this sector.

However, this partnership remains beset by various challenges. We can notice for instance that Ankara is offering the same security and military training format that African states already benefit from traditional partners, which makes the competition very tough. Following the field experience and the various discussions with some trainees, the issue of the language might also undermine these training partnerships. Additionally, as a country which is gradually becoming part of a global strategy, Turkey should ensure that its policies and offers in this area of security are not limited to targeting African Muslim countries.

Being also at the forefront of the contact zones of terrorism in the Middle East, it would be appropriate for Ankara to make it a unique branding in its security partnership offers in Africa. Especially since the terrorist challenges of groups such as Boko Haram, AQIM or Al-Shabaab occupy the top of the agenda, similar to challenges already faced by Turkey.

Finally, in terms of technology and infrastructures, although they are still dependent from Western partners in many ways, Turkey must take advantage of the capacity of its military offers to adapt to the structure of African defense markets, generally dominated by small budgets and low sophisticated logistics; something that Turkey can meet more easily than traditional western powers and with a better branding than China.

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Bio

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Article

Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals: South-South Cooperation and SDG 16

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Abstract

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the global community with hope and fanfare in 2015 but, its progress and realisation have been dented. In 2020, all the stakeholders involved ought to devise strategies in order to achieve the ambitious goals by 2030. This paper will discuss the challenges towards the progress of the goals and will debate as to why South-South Cooperation (SSC) is a unique and distinctive means of implementation towards the same. The paper will also introduce the operationalisation of goal 16 dealing with peace, justice and strong institutions through the lens of India's capacity building programmes under the rubric of the principles of SSC. The paper will deliberate on some of the inherent challenges associated with SSC and ways to tackle them. The paper will end with possible recommendations for reinvigorating the pace towards the achievement of SDGs.

Keywords

Sustainable Development Goals, South-South Cooperation, Goal 16

Introduction

The first round of development goals, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted by the global community in 2000. MDGs ran its course in 2015 and the incumbent, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in the same year for the next fifteen years. The development agendas have not only evolved in quantity, from 8 Goals, 18 Targets and 48 Indicators to 17 Goals, 169 Targets and 230 Indicators but, have also advanced qualitatively. Situating 17 SDGs covering 5 Ps: People, Planet, Peace, Partnership and Prosperity along with its impact on social, economic and environmental dimensions have qualitatively widened the scope of global goals as compared to MDGs. Apart from inclusion of new goals in SDGs, some of the goals that existed in MDGs have been expanded to connote qualitative widening.

For example, hunger and poverty were put together in MDG 1. However, with renewed understanding regarding poverty alleviation, aspirations of ending poverty and access to food including nutritional security have been separately placed in SDG 1 and 2 respectively. Also, the negotiation process of formulating SDGs were participatory and inclusive in nature with consultations taking place in a multi-stakeholder format in more than 100 countries. Policymakers, diplomats, academics and civil society organisations took part in the negotiation process. Such an across the board system was lacking during the MDGs formulation phase.

Another important addition in the SDGs are the Means of Implementation (MoI) for achieving the goals by 2030. SDG 17 is a standalone goal specifically geared towards MoI. Also, the a, b, c goals in each of the preceding 16 goals are the MoI. In terms of operationalisation, MDGs were seen as an aid driven (North-South) model whereas, SDGs have expanded the scope of implementation to include not only North-South Cooperation (NSC) but, also South-South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular Cooperation. The 2030 Document has specifically mentioned SSC to be a complementary mechanism for achieving SDGs. (UNGA, 2015).

Adoption of the SDGs in 2015 quickly coincided with the inward looking political and macroeconomic tendencies adopted by the (major) economically developed countries of the North. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused further damage to the already existing stress on multilateralism. SSC, as mentioned in the Agenda 2030 Document as a complementary mechanism for achieving SDGs is a unique MoI but, it too suffers from certain inherent challenges. However, at the same time it provides a unique, transformative and distinctive model achieving the goals (Cabral, Russo, and Weinstock, 2014). Discussion on these aspects are the need of the hour as the global landscape toward realisation of SDGs have deteriorated since 2015 with commitment to multilateral cooperation (central to the idea of SDGs) in under stress (ECOSOC, 2019).

This paper will start with the discussion on the threats to multilateralism which is hampering the progress and realisation of SDGs and the enhanced challenges posed by COVID-19. The section will end with a confidence that multilateralism and international cooperation are the only way forward towards achieving SDGs by 2030. Next section will briefly discuss the historical evolution of the North-South divide and the emergence of NSC and SSC. This section will talk about the principles of cooperation that guide respective cooperation activities. The section will also analyse the positives and advantages that SSC brings towards different aspects of development.

Section III will deal with the case study of India's SSC contribution in the realm

of Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (SDG 16). The section will start with context setting that SSC has traditionally dealt with only the mainstream developmental challenges of poverty, education, health, etc. and left the issues of peace, justice and institutions for the North to deal with. It will analyse as to why such dereliction on South's part is a mistake that needs rectification. The section will further analyse as to what India brings in through its operational principles of SSC in the issue areas of SDG 16 in form of capacity building. Next section will briefly discuss some of the inherent challenges in SSC and why/how a normative framework of the Right to Development can strengthen SSC towards realisation of SDGs.

Multilateralism in Retreat

In decades after the end of the Second World War, multilateralism took root where in institutions like the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and recently the Group of 20 (G20) have continued to formulate and direct financial infrastructure of the world; (initially) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and (later) the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are regulating the global trade; and the development, peace and human rights related issues are being tackled by the United Nations (UN). These institutions have had a chequered history. They have been able to make the world more prosperous, rules based, interconnected and globalised but, at the same time the world has grown more unequal both, inter-regionally and intra-regionally along with increased localised skirmishes and conflicts. Initial decades of multilateralism led to the spurt in economic prosperity of the global North and the same system assisted the growth of the major emerging countries from the global South. Negotiation and adoption of global agendas like the Addis Ababa Action Agenda; Agenda 2030; and the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 represented the high point of multilateralism (Linn, 2018).

International Organisations post 1945 were required as in the world plunged into the war in absence of a rules-based order. The above mentioned organisations evolved discourses and debates around perpetual and continued peace, effective human rights, multilateral trading system and financing after the end of the Second World War. These sectors were considered to be important areas to be worked on in order to stop the repeat of the war. Understanding of peace and human rights developed as a direct response towards the Holocaust, loss of young men at the battlefield and other associated tragedies. Protectionist trading practices and inward-looking financial structures, on the other hand, were understood to be the causes of the war as 1930s saw the Great Depression in the US and unsustainable economic, financial and trading practices which led to rise in nationalism across Europe (Sharma, 2018). In a way, multilateralism and rules-based order was considered to be a prerequisite for a peaceful world.

However, the same rules-based system of multilateralism and globalisation ignited discontent and rise in populism among the population which got left behind in this phase of growth. Domestic disintegration and the deepening divide between the winners and losers of this multilateral system have led to a populist backlash against the elites (Rodrik, 2020). This attack on the political elites have not only taken place across the major economies of the global North but, also in the global South. It has manifested differently wherein, the anger in developed countries have been directed towards a mistrust in the rules based multilateral order whereas, the governments in the developing countries have continued to repose faith in the existing order. However, rise in nationalism and authoritarian regimes in both, North and South are reversing the trends of democracies towards illiberalism.

Successful referendum in the United Kingdom for Brexit and election Donald Trump as the President of the United States have been regarded as turning points in the developed world where in these countries appear to lean towards transactional practices by favouring the interest of their respective countries at the cost of multilateralism (Linn, 2018). Domestically as well, the situation is of grave concern when people from the minority population are targeted be it discrimination based on race (typified by the #BlackLivesMatter movement), gender (typified by the #MeToo movement) and attacks on the religious minorities in various parts of the world. The emerging countries of the global South had already started the process of establishing their own institutions emanating from the frustratingly slow process of reforms in the international organisations of the WB, the IMF, the WTO and the UN. Institutionalisation of the BRICS led New Development Bank and China led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, along with a surge in number of free trade and regional trade agreements are a few cases in point.

Just as the world was already grappling with stressed multilateralism, COVID-19 has further pushed the idea of isolationism. COVID-19 has been unique in exacerbating the changes in the sphere of geopolitics. US under President Trump has frequently shown his displeasure towards multilateralism be it for NATO alliance in security arena (Borger, 2019) or referring negatively to UN and WTO (Johnson, 2019). He said in his (in)famous speech at UNGA 74 "The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots" (Gearan and Kim, 2019). Even during the pandemic, the announcement by the US President regarding rescinding the financial contribution to World Health Organisation (WHO) did not come as a surprise. Even some of its allies like Japan is thinking on similar lines (Wakatsuki, 2020). Cooperation and multilateralism in the European Union (EU) have also come under tremendous stress in this situation. EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen extended a 'heartfelt apology' to Italy on behalf of Europe, admitting that it had not been by its side since the beginning of the

crisis (Gill, 2020). Relations between US and EU soured as well when France (The Guardian, 2020) and Germany (Deutsche Welle, 2020) in separate incidents blamed the United States of high jacking the consignments of masks when the shipments were ready to be flown to the European countries from Shanghai and Bangkok airports respectively (Sharma, 2020).

It is important to underline that solidarity, rules based international cooperation and multilateralism are even more important in this crisis due to COVID-19. The present situation has reinforced the importance of multilateralism "more than ever before, we need solidarity, hope and the political will and cooperation to see this crisis through together" (UNGA, 2020). Isolationism and exclusionary tendency will only exacerbate the negative impact of the pandemic whereas multilateralism and inclusionary policy towards public health, and socio-economic response through mutual learning amongst countries affected will result in suppression of the virus, restart the economies and get SDGs back on track (UN, 2020). A collaborative approach is essential towards technical cooperation for sharing scientific and technological advancements related to universal health care and research and development of the requisite vaccine (UNGA, 2020).

Rules based (universality and indivisibility of human rights, non-selectivity, impartiality and objectivity) multilateral order will further be required for "expediting trade and transfer of essential medical supplies and equipment, including personal protective equipment for health-care and other front-line workers, and address intellectual property issues, to ensure that COVID-19 treatments are available and affordable to all" (Ibid, Para 69). It is extremely essential to keep ourselves reminded that "no-one is safe until everyone is safe" (Guterres, 2020). Inward looking and selfish policies at this time will only make the planet, a dangerous place to live in. The crises of COVID-19 must also initiate a process of reform of international organisations which are long due. It must be kept in mind that the rules based multilateral order is the only workable system we have; an ineffective and inefficient beggar-thy-approach gave us the Second World War.

With this background on the importance of multilateralism and international cooperation, it is the right time to introduce the debate around international cooperation with regards to development related activities. The subsequent section will discuss development cooperation, the north-south schism and issues dealing with peace and justice.

Development Cooperation and the North-South Divide

In order to better understand South-South Cooperation (SSC), it is imperative to have some background of NSC. NSC is a development concept in which there is a linear transfer of resources from a developed country to a developing coun-

try. It draws its origins from the reconstruction activities and economic recovery plans for Europe which was ravaged after the Second World War led by the US. Under the Marshall Plan initiated in 1948, US granted USD 15 billion (nearly100 billion in 2018 US dollars) for a period of four years to Europe for rebuilding war-torn regions, removing trade barriers, modernising Industries, improving European prosperity, and preventing the spread of Communism (Rosseel, De Corte, Blommaert, and Verniers, 2009). The reasons behind Marshall Plan were thus, both altruistic and strategic. On the one hand, USA aspired towards the development of Europe and on the other hand, fear of spread of Communism from the Soviet Union was palpable as well (Hogan, and Hogan, 1987). After the development activities in Europe, the attention of the US shifted to the developing world with the intention of replicating the successes of Europe in Asia, Africa and Latin America. By late 1950s, even Europe joined the bandwagon of NSC with the establishment of Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961 (Abdenur and Da Fonseca, 2013). Its members are high income countries with high Human Development Index and are considered to be the developed countries, the so-called global North.

Struggles of Global South

Global South has grappled with development challenges since post Second World War. At global stage, their struggle has been with industrialised countries of global North. Few of those in global North (victors of the War) have been major drivers of global economy; global financial institutions; global trade bodies; norm creators of human rights and environmental regimes; and have had hegemonic control over international relations and international law which governs the globe. Most of these developments in international relations and institution building at the behest of North took place in a non-inclusive and non-participatory manner. Southern countries inherited an international system of which they became a part much later as most of Asian and African countries were still colonised till late 1960s and nations of Latin America, though decolonised, did not wield agenda setting powers.

Late 1950s and 1960s saw some of the newly decolonised countries of Asia, Africa and now assertive Latin America challenge the status-quo and the system institutionalised by the global North at UN General Assembly. The Southern countries also came together to successfully lobby for creation of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as a permanent inter-governmental body housed in Geneva. Mandate of UNCTAD is to provide technical assistance tailored to the needs of the developing countries with special attention being paid to the needs of the least developed countries (LDCs) and countries with the greatest needs. The economic frustration experienced by now decolonised countries of Asia and Africa; and Latin America in 1960s and 1970s

led to the emergence of New International Economic Order (NIEO). This came about through realisation of newly independent countries that they had been born into a global political and economic system which they had neither created, nor was in their interest (Chakravarthi 1991).

The 1974 NIEO declaration specifically mentioned:

Para 1 "The developing countries, which constitute 70 per cent of the world's population, account for only 30 per cent of the world's income. It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent States and which perpetuates inequality" (Resolution 1964).

Para 3 "International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries" (Ibid, Page3).

Para 4 (1) "Ensuring that one of the main aims of the reformed international monetary system shall be the promotion of the development of the developing countries and the adequate flow of real resources to them" (Ibid, Page 4).

South-South Cooperation (SSC)

With all these developments taking place at the global level, Southern countries amongst themselves initiated a solidarity driven cooperation towards mainly, capacity development programmes, and also infrastructural and industrial developments. The Afro-Asian conference of Bandung in 1955 and subsequent emergence of its development offshoot (SSC) must be seen under the wider sphere of Global International Relations¹ as it was for the first time that a framework of enquiry in all its diversity, especially with due recognition of the experiences, voices and agency of non-Western peoples, societies and states, who were marginalised in the discipline of economics, development and international affairs, came to limelight (Acharya 2014). SSC in present times is certainly a non-western construct for inter-state and inter-social relations. The SSC pillars of shared identity; countries with similar levels of economic development; common goals; and

¹ It is pertinent to point out that discipline of International Relations (IR) emerged after the ravages of the Great War (1914-1918) with the sole intention of spreading peace, attaining peaceful settlement of disputes between countries and stopping a repeat of such dastardly wars. The developmental (trade, finance, peace and human rights) angle in IR was realised only when previous set of beliefs couldn't stop the Second World War (1939-1945). The victors of Second World War set the stage for IR in post 1945 era with establishment of various international and inter-governmental organisations. Emergence of Southern countries have brought in different set of value systems in existing IR. The discipline of IR now appears to be global in nature with infusion of ideas and principles from countries that were still under colonial rule right after 1945. This can be best viewed as transition of the discipline from IR to Global IR.

aspiration of equitable exchange situates SSC at different setting. (RIS 2016). The First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference or the First Tri-continental Solidarity Conference held in 1966 in Havana further consolidated the position of the Southern countries. An operational definition of SSC, based on 2009 Nairobi declaration, was agreed and it reads as "[SSC is] a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions" (UN, 2012).

It is important to note that over the years SSC has expanded both, in quantum and its geographical spread. Just as in trade, in SSC too, comparative advantages of countries involved played a significant role. For example, in initial phases of SSC, India, owing to better human resources in the field of education and engineering, assisted different Southern nations in developing their education system through capacity building programmes (Chaturvedi, 2016). Similarly, Cuba helped in strengthening the health sector in different African countries by sending their team of medical practitioners (Brouwer, 2011). Brazil has assisted other countries through their policy transfers (de Morais, 2005) and China in the recent decades has built infrastructure in various Southern countries (Abdenur, 2013). The plurality, which is a celebrated virtue of SSC, has put the concept in good stead over the years but, at the same has become the bane (due to a diverse nature of SSC) as no unified definition and a normative framework for SSC could emerge. More of this would be discussed in the last section of this paper.

Situation of SSC with respect to the challenges (discussed later) of narrow sector specificity, restricted modalities and lack of institutionalisation, along with limited quantum and restricted geographical spread, has improved, enhanced and developed to a large extent in recent years. Overall, in 2019 69 per cent of programme country governments in United Nations indicated that their country provides development cooperation to other countries through SSC (QCPR, 2020). Another 63 per cent countries claimed to have peer-to-peer exchange platforms for exchange information and best practices with Southern partners on science, technology, and innovation (Ibid.). SSC now is not restricted to only the modalities of capacity building, technical cooperation and knowledge transfer but, trade, finance, investment, grants and concessional loans also form a major part its modalities. Similarly, along with continuing the sectoral support to developing countries in health, education and agriculture, the sectors have now been expanded to infrastructure, connectivity, internet and communication technology, banking and insurance, peace industry, and humanitarian support. Policy trans-

fers, policy coordination, and sharing of development strategies have also become common within SSC.

Most of the major countries involved in SSC in present times were once the recipients of foreign aid from OECD member countries. The guiding principles of SSC that emerged over the years were a response against the hardships and challenges faced by Southern countries when receiving aid from the North (Mawdsley, 2012). It came to be seen as a statement which meant that Southern countries would not subject fellow developing countries to the same treatment which they suffered at the hands of the developed nations. This meant absence of any political and macro-economic conditionalities attached with development cooperation activities in SSC. However, on many occasions these guiding principles have either come under stress or a controversy has erupted where observers claimed SSC to be neo-colonial in nature. Conditionalities attached with foreign aid in NSC were mainly in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the North which was seen as policy intervention in the domestic affairs of the recipient countries (IPC-IG, 2010).

Towards late 1980s and 1990s, various research came forward which claimed that SAPs and conditionalities were counterproductive and the fiscal conservativeness were harming the essential sectors such as education, health and agriculture in the developing countries of Africa and Asia (Prabhu, 1996). In contrast, in line with the principle of respect for national sovereignty, SSC was sought to be developed based on the idea that the partner or the recipient countries themselves initiate, organise and manage SSC activities. SSC presumed interdependences, not new dependencies. The basic tenet that emerged for SSC was thus that international cooperation never ought to interfere with internal dynamics of the partner countries by providing policy recommendations, thereby challenging the national sovereignty of the partner. Nor did it seek to withhold and/or rescind partnerships due to changes in the policy and legislative spaces within the partner country.

Different approaches and understandings of SSC have led to the evolution of basic tenets of SSC. Operational Principles of SSC were ideated as (RIS, 2013):

Demand Driven

"In SSC, it is the partner or the recipient, rather than the provider as the source of funds or capacities that determines the priorities in the project. The selection of projects and the methods for implementation are decided in consultation with the partner and is never imposed" (Ibid).

Respect for national sovereignty

"In line with the principle of national sovereignty, the partner or the recipient countries themselves initiate, organise and manage SSC activities.

SSC is basically about interdependences, not new dependencies" (Ibid).

• Political and Macroeconomic Non-Conditionality²

"SSC never interferes with internal dynamics of the partner countries by providing policy recommendations thereby, challenging the national sovereignty of the partner. Nor does it withhold or/and rescinds partnerships due to changes happening within the partner country" (Ibid).

• Spirit of Sharing (Solidarity)

"One of the major tenants of SSC is that it is based on a partnership of partners involved with an absence of hierarchy in development cooperation. The spirit of sharing through capacity building and technology transfer continues to drive SSC" (Ibid).

• Mutual Benefit

"SSC is carried out in the nature of partnership to promote mutual benefit and thereby rejecting an unequal dependent relationship. The aim of cooperation is to create a higher level of capability and economic opportunity for both the partners, aimed at mutually beneficial interdependency" (Ibid).

The political solidarity within SSC has now progressed to a relationship based on the sound economic logic of win-win cooperation and mutual benefit for the countries without relinquishing the features of equality and trust. What really differentiates SSC from NSC is its demand driven nature along with an absence of conditionalities attached with the partners. India has believed in the principles of SSC and has been instrumental in its conceptual and normative growth since its origin.

Main differences between NSC and SSC can be summarised as below:

Parameters	North-South Cooperation	South-South Cooperation
Aim/Purpose	Historically altruistic endeavour	Solidarity driven mutual benefit endeavour
Geopolitical Origin	Emerged under Cold War rhetoric	Emerged during Non-Aligned Movement
Political Aspiration	Maintenance of North led International Order	Democratisation of International Order

² "The priorities and policies of the partner countries are not hindered in any manner and the non-interference in the internal affairs and the national sovereignty of the development partner is also taken care of, thus making the SSC more efficient and cost-effective. By not imposing any conditionalities, SSC gives the power of independent decision making to the partner countries, keeping in view their aspirations and special values. Thus, the SSC believes in respecting the independence and national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity of local content" (RIS, 2013).

Parameters	North-South Cooperation	South-South Cooperation
Primary Drivers	OECD-DAC members	Global South (Tri-continentalism: Asia, Africa and Latin America)
Nature of Partners	Donor from an industrialised state with high per capita income	Partnership between states with similar level of development
Theoretical Basis	Theory of Change	Lacks theorisation
Philosophical Basis	Framework Approach	Ingredient Approach
Conditionality	Extensive political and macroeco- nomic conditionalities	Presence of soft procedural conditionalities
Operational Sovereignty	Multilayered time-consuming bu- reaucratic structures, hence added transaction cost	Highly decentralised and relatively fast with few implications for transaction cost
Institutional Oversight	No global body. OECD acts as a Secretariat	No global body. Tri-continental multi-stakeholder partnership on the rise
Public Perception	Negative with inward-looking tendencies in donor countries	Positive with belief in globalisation in partner countries

Source: Adapted from (Chaturvedi, 2014) and (Lengyel and Malacalza, 2011)

After this introduction of SSC and NSC, it is pertinent to move towards the case study part of the paper which would discuss the issues of SDG 16 and the role of India's SSC engagements towards the achievements of goals and targets as enshrined in SDG 16 though the modality of capacity building.

Global South and the Idea of Peace and Development

Traditionally, Southern countries have primarily focused on development from a conventional sense in form of finances, trade, technology and infrastructure. It is important to point out that a sovereign state can develop by many different processes (Sengupta, 2002). There may be a sharp increase in gross domestic product (GDP), mainly spearheaded by richer sections of the society which have greater access to financial and human capital. In the process of GDP led growth, it is this group that further consolidates their wealth becoming increasingly prosperous. The schism between rich and poor gets widened further in this type of development. The second way of development is through industrialisation, rapid or not so rapid. In this case as well, the benefits accruing because of increased industrialisation does not trickle down to the small-scale and informal sectors (Ibid). These sectors get further marginalised. Third modality of development may be through an impressive growth of export industries with increased access to global markets. This has the danger of non-integration of economic hinterland into the process of growth (Ibid). All these may be regarded as development in the conventional sense. The efforts of global South through NIEO, or through UNCTAD, or through SSC have tended to view development and achieve development in this conventional sense. Most of the Southern countries after their independence

lacked well trained citizens and skilled manpower who could become part of their workforce. Thus, building capacities of the young population with establishment of training institutes, colleges and universities also became the immediate focus of these governments.

Apart from marginalisation of specific groups as mentioned above, the conventional development has also almost sidetracked peace and security paradigm of development. One of the reasons for absence of peace and security dimension of development in SSC agenda is attributed to the fact that many Southern countries believed that peace was a North led process. At the international level after the end of World War II, normative peace has been understood through the lens of Realism. Realist understanding of peace has been 'absence of war', Johan Galtung described it as 'negative peace'. The present understanding of peace has been understood as 'liberal peace' (Richmond, 2006) and has been determined by the securitisation agenda propelled by the countries of global North. This straight jacketed and formulaic neo-liberal peace package consists of bringing warring parties together with the intention of power sharing followed by holding democratic elections. The subsequent process is then the (re)introduction of neo-liberal market-driven economic policies. All these initiatives would take place under the aegis of a Northern donor and is also informally known as the Washington consensus.

North led processes also led to rise of 'military-industry complex' and 'peace industry' which included arms manufacturing enterprises and non-governmental organisations; consultancies; think-tanks and research centers which addressed security, conflict and peacebuilding (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley, 2018). Most of the Southern countries, till to this day, depend on their Northern partners, either materially for access to arms and ammunitions, or intelligence and intellectual support or sometimes both with respect to peace and security paradigm. The Southern presence in peace-building process has traditionally been in the post-conflict infrastructure, capacity and institution building project activities. For example, India's post-conflict reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Its development activities in Afghanistan could be categorised under humanitarian assistance, infrastructure development, small community development projects and capacity building programmes aimed towards training students, teachers, medical and health practitioners, and training in fields of agriculture and other primary occupations. However, there are instances of Southern countries contributing to the process of peacebuilding. South Africa for example, has embarked upon peacebuilding initiatives in Democratic Republic of Congo employing the convergent and divergent operational methods with the dominant liberal model of peacebuilding (Lalbahadur and Rawhani, 2018). In the past, India, had played an overlooked but significant role during the Korean War (1950-53), by mediating at the behest of United Nations between the warring parties (Barnes, 2013). Also, in 1953, an Indian initiative at United Nations General Assembly led to the formation of the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations (Prashad, 2007). Apart, from them, South's role in UN led peacekeeping operations have been well documented.

The differences between North led peace model and SSC are as follows:

Principle	Peacebuilding	South-South Cooperation	
Ownership	Multilateral programmes are initi- ated in consultation with national leadership which set peacebuilding priorities across sectors National leadership articles are initi- need for specific projects ensures participation of entities on a long-term be		
Mutual Benefit	Programmes are designed to bring peace in host societies	Projects are designed for mutual benefit	
Equality and Horizontality	Donor-recipient relationship	Partnership among equals; mutual respect for sovereign equality with sense of mutual welfare	
Conditionality	Presence of political and macro- economic conditionalities (Liberal Peace/Washington consensus)	Absence of political and macroeco- nomic conditionalities	
Mutual accountability	There is greater accountability through targets and indicators	There is capacity building through transfer of skills, knowledge and sharing of best practices	
Complementarity	Programme objectives aligned with priorities of the country concerned	Demand-driven programmes aligned with the priorities of the partner country.	
Monitoring and Evaluation	The extension of programmes is based on progress achieved towards pre-determined benchmarks	Intends to follows the principles of Impact Assessment	
Operationality	Follows straightjacket approach: peacemaking – agreement of power sharing between warring parties – holding democratic elec- tions – introduction of neo liberal economic policies	Emphasis on the replication and adaptation of successful experienc- es already implemented in other developing countries. Adoption of inter-substitutable modalities.	

Source: Adapted from (Mathur, 2013)

SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Apart from other major differences between MDGs and SDGs, which are beyond the scope of this paper, one of the most crucial is inclusion of a standalone goal related to peace and security; justice; and institutions in SDGs. The general consensus amongst development thinkers and practitioners were that a peaceful environment is essential for realisation of SDGs and in turn an enabling environment of sustainable development is required for a peaceful society. Also, the normative and operational pillars of United Nations in form of peace and security, human rights and development forms a mutually reinforcing compact. Ar-

ticle 1(3)³ of the UN Charter states the interlinkages between these three pillars (Kanade, 2018). The inclusion of peaceful, just and inclusive societies with presence of effective and accountable institutions (SDG 16) is thus critical towards realising sustainable development and yet it was totally ignored in the MDGs (Coonrod, 2014).

Inclusion of peace and security; justice and institutional dimensions in the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986, Martha Nussbaum's ideation of Quality of Life in 1993 and Amartya Sen's moral framework of capabilities approach (duly incorporated in UN's development Programme) further problematises the absence of peace and security; justice; and institutional dimensions in MDGs which were adopted in 2000. It became clear that not only direct violence, but also structural factors that lead to violence such as violations of human rights can result in undermining sustainable development (Kanade, 2018). These realisations were the fundamental basis for inclusion of above mentioned three pillars in SDGs. Overall SDG 16 "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" falls in the category of enabling goals. SDG 16 as enabling goal means that it will act as catalyst in promoting, sustaining human development and will play an active role in realisation of other goals. SDG 16 should be viewed to consist of four pillars: targets associated with peaceful societies; access to justice; national policies catering towards effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; and international cooperation towards building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at regional and multilateral levels.

Institutions and SSC

SDG 16 leans towards good governance spectrum of liberal democracy with its focus on peaceful and inclusive societies along with emphases on justice and institutions. This section will discuss one of the essential pillars of SDG 16 being role of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions. As has been understood that most of the development challenges lies in the global South and that the normative and operational principles of SSC are best suited to realise SDGs. In this backdrop it is essential to discuss SSC's role with respect to institution's creation and institution building. This becomes all the more important in wake of criticism levelled against the South in terms of their inability to create, establish and support institutions both, domestically and across developing countries. For SSC to be made effective at national, regional and multilateral levels, it is imperative that it is strengthened through South led political institutions at multilateral level like G77 and the NAM; at regional level like Association of Southeast Asian na-

tions (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the African Union, the Caribbean Community, MERCOSUR; at inter-regional level like BRICS and IBSA; policy institutions like the South Centre, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Network of Southern Think Tanks; and its financial institutions like the BRICS led New Development Bank and South led multilateral development Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank towards formulating a unified Southern positions on development projects, policy coordination and collective action.

One of the areas where SSC needs to evolve is its traditional weak organisational structure and lack of institutionalised support, both domestically and globally. Inadequate and ineffective institutions coupled with lack of financial resources and political will and along with tendency of Southern countries to lean towards global North with respect to seeking solutions and intellectual inspiration have damaged the furtherance of SSC (Paolo, 2019). South also lacks a common and permanent platform for regular consultations on various issues, something that North has in form of OECD. At the multilateral level, UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) is playing the aggregator's role of good practices, sharing information, experiences and lessons learnt for the benefit of Southern countries in particular and for global good in general, however, quite rightly, its mandate does not cover policy making exercises on different dimensions of SSC. In the last two decades, SSC has expanded in its geographical reach, in its financial capabilities, in its sectoral plurality and number of Southern countries which are actively pursuing cooperation with other developing countries.

Also, over the past decades, there has been a proliferation of Triangular Development Cooperation (TDC). TDC is another way through which development in a Southern country can be achieved. There are different combinations of TDC with the most commonly observed TDC being in terms of a DAC member as the provider, an emerging economy as the pivot country and a low-income country (LIC) as the partner. There are many other combinations possible, for example two or three middle income countries (MICs) coming together with or without a multilateral organisation or a DAC member with a multilateral agency. Implementation of development projects in developing countries at the behest of IBSA cooperation is an example of TDC where India, Brazil and South Africa have pooled in resources and UNOSSC is the implementing agency. In wake of these developments, Southern institutions are greatly needed in order to guide SSC as an important mechanism of means of implementation towards realising SDGs.

Report of the Secretary General on state of SSC in August 2017 mentions that expansion of SSC needs to be strengthened by institutionalisation of the process (UNGA, 2017). The report came up with salient dimensions of the institutionalisation process. It mentioned about the increasing interest in Southern countries

³ "To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Kanade, 2018).

to come up with specific ministries, departments, agencies, portfolios, etc. to deal with issues of SSC. These processes not only help in streamlining the country's SSC initiatives but, also help United Nations country teams to strengthen their engagement with host Governments on South-South and triangular cooperation initiatives. It further mentions the multi-stakeholder nature of SSC wherein there are active involvement of civil society organisations, academic institutions, private sector and volunteer groups. Thus, in a way decentralised SSC has become more formalised. As mentioned previously, SSC has existed since late 1940s and 1950. The experience and knowledge acquired by Southern countries have enabled them to underscore their comparative advantages significantly. These years have also led academics, policy makers, diplomats, development practitioners and other relevant actors to specialise in SSC. All these factors have contributed towards initiating a process of institutionalising SSC.

Capacity Building by India in the realm of SDG 16

The aforementioned developments towards the institutionalising SSC is mainly being accomplished by emerging Southern countries. The lack of institutions in LDCs is still a problem to reckon with. It is here that capacity development programmes through technical cooperation by middle income Southern countries focused on the specific needs of LDCs and other developing countries becomes important. For example, capacity building initiatives by India are channelled through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) which was formalised in 1964, though India has provided human resources assistance to developing countries since its independence in 1947 (Kumar 1987). Scholarships and educational exchange remain a significant part of ITEC to this day. ITEC is offering training to more than 12,000 candidates per year from 161 countries through 52 institutions which cover over 300 courses (ITEC, 2020). Total number of people trained since ITEC's inception stands at 80,344 (MEA, 2020), starting with a small number of nine scholarships just after independence. (FIDC, 2016). Approximately USD 3 billion has been spent on ITEC programmes since its inception (Call and Coning, 2017). Out of 300 different capacity building courses every year under the aegis of ITEC, there are specific courses which are strongly aligned with the institutions of democracy in Southern countries. In June 2011, the Election Commission of India (ECI), conceptualised and and set up the India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management (IIIDEM) to advance the professional competence in election management, promote people's participation, contribute to developing stronger democratic institutions and support the efforts of ECI in carrying out its mandate and functions in India. It also carried out training and capacity building programmes for other developing countries. Since, its inception IIIDEM has organised 37 international capacity building programmes with participants from 85 developing countries forming its alumni.

The specific themes covered under the training curriculum of Capacity Building for Use of Electoral Technology are as follows:

Themes	Sub-Themes		
Introduction to Technology and Elections	Role of Technology in Electoral Process, its Benefits and Challenges, Core Elements of International Electoral Standard and its Legal Framework.		
Voter Education	Emerging Technologies: Emerging Technologies for Voter Education, Uses and Challenges of Internet/Mobile Applications, Social Media etc.		
Voter Registration	Technologies for Voter Registration, Biometric Systems, Electoral Roll Management Systems, De-duplication and Statistical Tools to Improve the Health of Electoral Roll.		
Inclusion and Technology	Ways Technology Increases Women's Participation and Technologies to Enhance Participation of People with Disabilities to strengthen the inclusion process.		
Geographic Information System (GIS)	Use of GIS in Demarcating Constituencies and Polling Station Areas, GPS Mapping of Polling Station Locations, Mapping Vulnerable Areas, Tracking Election Materials etc.		
Expenditure Control/Campaign Finance Module of ECI	Indian System of Monitoring the Electoral Campaign Expenses, Campaign Finance in Electoral Campaign, Technological Options for Presenting and Submitting Financial Reports and Statements.		
Social Media in Electoral Campaigns			
Election Monitoring	SMS/Internet based Poll Monitoring System, Hot Lines and webcasting etc. for monitoring operations and Case Studies.		
Mapping Electorally Vulnerable	Areas - Electoral Risk Management Tool		
Voting and Counting Technologies	EVMs/VVPAT, Results Transmission Systems and Case Studies.		
E-Learning	Capacity Building of Poll Personnel through Online Application and Multimedia-based Learning		

Source: Author's Compilation based on India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management. Available at: https://eci.gov.in/files/file/4700-iiidem-organizes-12-day-training-programme-on-capacity-development-for-election-management-for-itec-countries-in-association-with-mea-english-stal/ Accessed on July 2, 2020. and; ITEC 2019-20. Available at: https://www.itecgoi.in/courses_list.php?salt3=7334dbb8f32019-2020&salt4=b320dddf5f25&salt=b616c95082135 Accessed on July 2, 2020.

Other (specimen) courses under ITEC 2019-20 which substantiates different aspects of SDG 16 are as follows:

Themes Banking, Insurance, Finance, Accounts and Audit	Associated SDG 16 Targets 16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and
banking, insurance, rimance, recounts and rudit	arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of
	stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime

Themes	Associated SDG 16 Targets
Strategic Financial Management	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
Public Expenditure Management	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
Banking and Finance	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
International Programme in Bank Financial Management (Focus: Risk Management and Basel II and III and Accord)	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
International Programme in Asset-Liability Management in Banks and Financial Institutions	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
International Training Programme in Legislative Drafting	16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
International Training Programme at National Centre for Good Governance	16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
Training program for Judicial Officers	16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all 16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
Training in Development Journalism	Various targets across SDG 16

Source: Author's Compilation

SSC and Inherent Challenges

SSC has been celebrated as a distinctive operational model and has now emerged

as one of the main operational tools available towards realisation of global development goals, including the SDGs (UNGA, 2015). However, current SSC policies and practices adopted by different countries are quite diverse and operate in absence of a normative framework, making its implementation arbitrary, subject to the level of power wielded by the provider country and thus, SSC has been claimed to be a vague term (Dembowski, 2018). The countries involved in SSC have operationalised their projects through their indigenous understanding of SSC involving various modalities and sector specificities. This has certainly led to enhanced visibility of SSC, increase in its quantum and expansion in its geographical spread, but a theoretical and normative framework couldn't be worked and agreed upon (Quadir, 2013). However, the basic tenets of SSC (previously mentioned) have been questioned in recent past, mainly with respect to China as the country has come forward with ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for infrastructure and connectivity projects in developing countries. Interestingly, the criticisms have come from both Northern (DOD, 2019) and Southern (MEA, 2020) countries alike who have claimed BRI to be debt-trap diplomacy (Chellany, 2017; Ferchen, 2018; Lindberg and Lahiri, 2018). The lack of theorising research on the topic of SSC has resulted in its unfulfilled potential towards contributing to realisation of sustainable and equitable development for all cooperating parties, including the partner country (DIIS, 2015). Growth and expansion of SSC in recent decades, bereft of a normative framework, has resulted in the same challenges which were and are being faced by traditional models of cooperation such as NSC (Zheng, 2010; Junbo and Frasheri, 2014).

As a natural progression to NIEO, idea of Right to Development emerged in 1986 in form of Declaration on the Right to Development (RtD). NIEO, as discussed previously, was based on outcome idea of economic development but, RtD expanded the scope of development to include a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aimed at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals. Thus, RtD emphasised on the process and outcome aspect of achieving economic development whereas, NIEO was concerned more about the economic outcome. Resolution concerning NIEO led to fruition of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) in 1978 what is now informally referred to as Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA). All these three processes were led by developing countries and dimension of international cooperation were present in all these declarations.

Normative basis for realisation of RtD through international cooperation (including SSC) have been specifically mentioned in 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; UN Millennium Declaration which led to the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000; and in four 2015 declarations of the Third

International Conference on Financing for Development; Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Paris Agreement on climate. In particular, MDGs were negotiated by global community with one of the stated objectives being "making the right to development a reality for everyone" (UNGA, 2000). Later in 2015, SDGs recognised that it is "grounded" in the RtD. It did this by specifically acknowledging that the SDGs are "grounded" in the UN Millennium Declaration, which as mentioned, contained a categorical commitment to making the RtD a reality for everyone.

These collective and consensual assertions by nation states that the SDGs reaffirms the RtD, is informed by the Declaration on RtD. Such a linkage should be seen as a mandate that implementation of SDGs must be essentially founded on operationalisation of RtD (Kanade 2018 a). As mentioned previously, RtD seeks to achieve economic well-being for all through a just and equitable process; and SSC embodies many of the principles enshrined in RtD such as equality, inclusiveness, participation, national ownership and self-determination (UNGA, 2018). As SSC has been accepted to be an important Means of Implementation (MoI) for realising SDGs, it now time to actualise SSC based on normative principles of RtD. Many observers have critiqued that MDGs could have achieved much more had sustainable means of implementation been deployed. Similarly, if the global community aspires to realise SDGs, it must internalise the sustainable means of implementations (RtD). RtD has two limbs; duty which a state has towards its citizens; and responsibility that the global community has towards developing countries with respect to SDGs. India, through its development cooperation and other Southern countries through the principles of SSC believe in similar two-pronged approach towards realisation of SDGs. Moreover, normative principles of development cooperation are best captured in the RtD framework which treats development not as a charity or privilege but as a right of all human persons and peoples everywhere, bearing corresponding duties on States, individually and collectively (Kunanayakam, 2013).

One of the main challenges inherent in development cooperation, including SSC is the lack of duties and responsibilities ascribed to the countries involved in realisation of SDGs. The RtD entails duties on all States to respect, protect and fulfil the RtD across the following three levels:

- States acting individually as they formulate national development policies and programmes affecting persons within their jurisdiction;
- States acting individually as they adopt and implement policies that affect persons not strictly within their jurisdiction; and
- States acting collectively in global and regional partnerships.

The RtD imposes an obligation on States, individually and collectively, to eliminate existing obstacles to its realisation, refrain from making policies which are averse to its realisation, and to positively create conditions favourable to its realisation. Most importantly, the RtD imposes a duty on States with respect to international cooperation to realise the RtD. The issue of obligation becomes more pertinent in times when multilateralism is under stress as countries tend to not follow through on their commitments related to SDGs. Realisation of SDGs by 2030 appears bleak in absence of the RtD framework. A counter-factual narrative drives home the point with regards to the necessity of the RtD as a normative framework for development cooperation including SSC (Kanade, 2020).

Just as the responsibilities of countries are three levelled in international cooperation when viewing it through the lens of the RtD, similar level of categorisation is also essential when tackling SDG 16. Targets within SDG 16 can be differentiated into bits that would require international cooperation and others that entail national policy building endeavours.

Global and National Obligations of Specific Targets within SDG 16

Pillars of Institution Building in SDG 16	Associated Targets in SDG 16			
	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime			
International cooperation towards building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at regional and multilateral levels	16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels			
	16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance			
	16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements			
	16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime			
	16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development			
National policies catering towards effective, accountable and inclusive institutions	16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms			
	16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels			
	16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels			

Source: Adapted from (Behar, 2016)

Conclusion and Recommendations

- SSC are unique, popular and effective mode of development cooperation as compared to NSC. It has grown in quantum and geographical spread over the years not only, through the favourable policy making by countries of the South but, also at the behest of international organisations. Also, as mentioned previously, initiatives by the UN Office for South-South Cooperation have been commendable. However, there are challenges within the operationalisation of SSC which needs to be looked and discussed. Some of those challenges have been discussed in this paper.
- India's capacity building initiatives towards SDG 16 have already been explained and elaborated in the paper. However, specific targets of SDG 16 must be individually emphasised by countries to help realise the goals and targets of SDGs. Mainstreaming of SSC in various UN agencies have been initiated but, they need to be further strengthened by incorporating the RtD as their normative framework.
- Just as all the goals and targets of SDGs, SDG 16 has also been found
 deficient in its progress and realisation since its adoption in 2015 (HLPF,
 2019). A consensus driven model between North and South will go a long
 way in achieving the targets. Similarly, specific targets must also be identified for international and national level coordination to come up robust
 institutions.
- Also, after the COVID-19 pandemic, the world needs to get together, possibly at the UN level to discuss and deliberate on various issues related to multilateralism. Many of the challenges in multilateralism (in present times) have cropped up due to lack of reforms in this process and in the institutions of global governance. Countries (both North and South) need to realise that the world is/will be a better place to live in with rules-based multilateral order however, it needs to be fixed at the soonest.
- UN agencies need to strengthen their work and activities on multilateral economic policy issues, including on international trade and finance. There needs to be an impetus towards more research, financing, technical assistance, and capacity building to be provided to developing countries as many of the challenges associated with SDG 16 are present in developing and low-income countries (Ibid, Page 22). There also needs to be a push for their SSC institutions to facilitate their coordination and collective engagement in multilateral policy discussions and negotiations.
- COVID-19 has to some extent already dismantled the traditional understanding of things. The presence of disadvantaged population in the North

which are suffering disproportionately more as compared to the privileged population in the developed countries; and also the presence of immune, secluded and safe elites in the global South have brought things in perspective. In a way the existence of "South in the North and North in the South" (de Sousa Santos, 2015) has been brought out clearly in the open for everyone to see.

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Bio

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Book Review

Political Economy of Today's SAARC as a Regional Alliance as well as a Global Operation: Problems, Prospects and Proposals

Shahid Javed Burki
South Asia in the New World Order: The Role of Regional Cooperation
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Abstract

In his assessment of this solely-written book, which is about cumbersome challenges, prospective opportunities and future directions for South Asia as an integrative identity towards regional sustainable development as well as a cooperative process targeting global policy engagement amid the cutting-edge century globalization gyrating relentlessly around international relationship politics and intergovernmental agreement economics, the reviewer has sharply disagreed with the author's ideas, insights and arguments to live up to his expectations. In the volume, for instance, he covered every member country of the SAARC but committed to none of them as a focal case. Seemingly, the writer with his carping approaches did not answer any of many lurking questions he himself posed. Yet, he somehow succeeded in his ordinarily suited goals. Undeniably, he has come up with some valuable suggestions that are sensibly made more significant by the evaluator. Because of its timeliness, fondness and seriousness, this title compared to the available similar publications might fittingly contribute to the related academic literature. In sum, the innovative, impartial and interdisciplinary piece as an outcome from cerebral interaction between the reviewer and the author both of whom were awarded internationally outstanding commendations in acknowledgement of their respective professional excellence could surely spellbind many foreign affairs readers across South Asia and the world at large.

Keywords

South Asia, SAARC, Bangladesh, India, world, globalization, political economy, international relations, regional integration, development cooperation

The Introductory Contexts

The 'who vs whom' contradistinction really matters for a review of any book in terms of sensible reasoning and excellent quality. In such a point of fact, I have a long track record of substantial, groundbreaking and meaningful research accomplishments, which received an exceptionally high-profile international academic recognition, when winning Asia research scholar awards named after Japan's two most renowned prime ministers (Yasuhiro Nakasone and Masayoshi Ohira). Precisely, most of these rewarding works are concentrated immanently upon relationship and partnership of South Asia with such extra-regional great power as Japan, while my extensively diversified areas of expertise circumscribe global governance, international relations, political economy and sustainable development of a thriving Asia amid the increasingly globalizing world today. Moreover, I have recently founded and created the Dhaka-based Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS), which has already proved itself as a top-notch research institution inside and outside Asia. This is mainly why I took interest in reviewing this volume.

The book is actually the outcome of the author's research project completed with an awarded fellowship at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) of National University of Singapore (NUS). As the writer acknowledges, he was grateful to this institution for its logistic support as well as many of his colleagues (senior South Asia scholars and researchers) at this institution for their sustained encouragement and enlightened recommendation. In the publication's 'Prologue' (Chapter 1), he also enthusiastically rhapsodizes about the details of his incredible personal life with both academic career and professional history. Educated at Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar and at Harvard University as a Mason fellow, he has in fact served for the World Bank in various senior positions from 1974 to 1999, including regional vice president (for Latin America and the Caribbean). This seasoned economist, who is also a former finance minister of Pakistan, is currently acting as chairman of the Bukri Institute of Public Policy (BIPP), a Lahore (Pakistan)-based independent think-tank after his own name. However, as I have read his book to the furthest extent, it is better to revolve around its 'more weaknesses' than 'less strengths'.

Blurred and Imprudent Title

Seeing its heading, I thought that the book would have lucidly investigated whether and why the South Asian regional cooperation is considerably efficacious by this time as well as how and when it could assume a serviceable contribution to South Asia in the midst of the 21st century world order. But I have become bewildered, after unearthing the contents of this publication. Out of its eight chapters, four chapters (Chapters 4-6 and 8), which are not directly related to

the thematic stream of this study, give the impression of being a nugatory inclusion. The last sentence of the book's last chapter reads: "The positive economic consequences of opening up to one another would be enormously significant. There would also be positive outcomes on the political side, but that is entirely different subject better dealt with by those who have greater competence in that area" (p. 182). This statement sounds quite contradictory, because a major position of the volume deals with a complete breadth of concerns covering political (and even strategic) concerns in addition to social and cultural facets of all countries of South Asia. For example, Chapter 4 deals completely with history's many burdens confronting this sub-region of Asia. In words of the author himself: "I have focused so much attention on the importance of history for understanding why people and nations behave in certain ways" (p. 1). Indeed, he believes that one of the most crucial reasons South Asia has not been able to progress as a region is that history weighs heavily on the countries in the area. Also, a full-fledged chapter is concentrated on the three national elections (in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) locally, which he regards as good indications for democratic advancement and the main priorities of the people in this region other than religion and politics, principally involving insurgencies rooted in ethnicity in Sri Lanka and Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan.

In any case, I expected that the author would have determinately furnished a separate chapter on the theoretical literature for 'international political economy', which is the mixture of politics and economics intricately crisscrossed with international relations. But he, who is an expert basically on economic history, did not do it for this interdisciplinary research. Besides, although this volume's title has run my eyes over the subject, the phrases 'World Order' (in the main title) and 'Regional Cooperation' (in the sub-title) are explained neither analytically nor prescriptively. In this respect, it is still unclear why the phrase 'Economic Integration' (as an economic arrangement between different countries, sub-regions or regions) apart from or instead of 'Regional Cooperation' is not applied. Moreover, 'East Asia', 'rising Asia', 'Asian century', 'bipolarity', 'multipolarity', 'superpower', 'globalization', 'global economy', etc., are chiefly used without justifiable elucidation of any of these locutions. Lastly, viewing that the main title seems less applicable or too enthusiastic, it is unconnected with the sub-title to many extents.

Indo-Pak War vs Bangladesh

To be more comprehensive, the adverse implication of intra-regional strife between India and Pakistan in South Asia on regional cooperation and economic integration is traditionally explored in this study. Obviously, an already countless and expanding number of productions on each of these aspects are available in the related domain of academic literature. Anyway, I wanted to know more specifically how Indo-Pak tug of war over Kashmir as the flashpoint for armageddon

in addition to the reportedly regional 'hegemony' of India and the 'hypocrisy' of Pakistan might bring a severely destructive ramification on South Asia, as both countries with their nuclear weapons constantly threaten each other and thereby escalate tension among other nations of this region. Some strategists foretell that India and Pakistan will fight against each other and a nuclear weapon-free Bangladesh that with the deepest sincerity is opting for peace will gain. Although the writer at the same time provides the readers with a gnomic report on the state-to-state disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, he contrastingly commends that Bangladesh carries its own weight of history, which is different from the one Pakistan has borne.

Nevertheless, understanding that 'civil war' in the simplest term is a war between citizens of the same country, the author (as a Pakistani citizen) abruptly obfuscates the issue of Bangladesh's 'liberation war' as a 'civil war'. He himself describes that this civilian war was fought between a regular force from West Pakistan and irregulars popularly known as 'freedom fighters' (mukti bahini) by the people of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). I am really wondering to see how he hides the historical facts that the West Pakistani armed forces particularly with their 'operation searchlight' as a planned and targeted attack ferociously murdered thousands of unarmed and innocent civilians in erstwhile East Pakistan to curb the Bengali nationalist movement here, when they were allegedly guilty of their atrocities for mass rape and sexual violence. I do not think that punishment simply as the act of punishing these West Pakistani military offenders will be enough. According to him, the people of West Pakistan treated East Pakistan's freedom fighters merely as 'miscreants' (wrongdoers or lawbreakers) who similarly act in many civil wars. But he should have openly urged his nation, in which many Pakistanis in the new generation have still a very poor understanding of not only the never-forgettable contribution of these truly courageous and ultimately life-sacrificing martyrs to the emergence of Bangladesh but also the history of a united Pakistan, to formally apologize to Bangladesh for the world's most heinous war crimes against humanity and the unprecedented genocide (of as many as three million people killed) committed by the Pakistan military junta, their suppression of brutality and Pakistan's shameful surrender eventually in the 1971 war's end. Also, he says that Pakistan was able to make quick economic adjustments of its own to the loss of East Pakistan, and he was summoned back from Harvard University to lend a helping hand with the process. But he avoids saying how the rulers of West Pakistan extremely deprived East Pakistan during 1947-1971 that consequently led to the liberation struggle. So, it would have been acceptable if he had fairly lighted upon the truth that Bangladesh, which as a 'heroic nation' won its glorious independence (incredibly supported by India) from Pakistan in the 1971 historic war of bloodbath is the only exceptional example in Asia in such a successful revolution for any sovereign state worldwide.

My Counters to His Arguments

Notwithstanding, when it comes to the researcher's culminating arguments, I have my mixed reactions. In the beginning, he opines: "In Chapter Seven I will suggest why South Asia could do much better by adopting a regional approach, and become a part of the multilayered world that is becoming into being" (p. 6). As he continues, South Asia has two options as follows: it could pursue narrow national interests, or it could work as a region with the counties in the area prepared to step forward and devise ways of working as a cohesive and well-integrated region. He emphasizes that regional integration would help South Asia to find a place for itself in the rapidly changing global economy. As he also thinks, the full advantage of globalization might not be realized without integration, and South Asia, compared with other world regions, in particular those in an emerging Asia, will be left behind. I agree with such a conventionally held viewpoint behind the author's effort in the sense that reframing a 'regional approach' as against 'national approach' will definitely herald many successful economic development stories for South Asia, especially in terms of common commercial benefits from regional association, ie, an increase in the each individual country's economic growth rate. But I do not agree with him, because practicing a new regional approach might not be an absolutely single and novel idea about addressing the factors that bring about the regional dissection, let alone contributing to South Asia's engagement with the future multipolar world with a multifarious and multifaceted approach rather than the bipolarity between China as a would-be predominant superpower and the United States (US) as a long-held sole hegemon.

The research unfolds that an attempt to repair or improve the global system in a casual or desultory way will not be effective for solving the economic and financial problems the world faces in the concurrent millennium. Therefore, even though a set of arrangements established internationally for preserving global stability over a few decades after the end of the Second World War was practicable, it needs to be reformed fundamentally with the adjustable conditions for the humankind. In essence, the argument advanced in this work is that the emergence of a multipolar world is better aligned with Asia's interests. Nonetheless, the writer does not more persuasively examine the effect of such a framework on the engagement of South Asia with the globe as well as on the relationships among and controlling events of the countries of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), even by advancing a pathway for economic grounds. For instance, he does not indispensably ferret out why New Delhi seeks to find an option of dragging Pakistan to the dispute resolution body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for refusing to reciprocate for India's granting of the most favored nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, even after 20 years. In particular, a discussion about how Pakistan as India's nuclear-armed foe reacts to India's membership (only one from South Asia) at the Group of Twenty (G20) that helps the latter boost its

role in the global economic governance architecture is completely absent. On the other hand, the book lacks its answer to a question how India feels at a time when China as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) manipulates its veto power resistant to India because Beijing diplomatically uses Pakistan as a strategic alliance puppet against India. Whereas, the author easily guesses that such a development would take place if China and India, each with its own sphere of influence, work with rather than going against each other.

Anyway, the idea of the SAARC was first mooted by the then Bangladesh's President in Dhaka in 1985. But it is clear that this regional institution comprising eight member states created more than three decades ago has yet been able to develop a long-term and strongly coordinated stratagem to tackle the non-traditional security (ie, human security) issues including food insecurities, health vulnerabilities, natural disasters, etc., by enlarging its voice at such global multilateral organization as the UN. As the author confesses, South Asia is one of the few regions in the world where regionalism did not work, while this region has relatively made a weak attempt at regional integration. As also states in the book, the SAARC lags far behind other regional groupings notably in contrast to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in terms of not only per capita income level but also its dominance in the world order while integrating itself in the global trading system.

Besides, the writer sees Pakistan as a 'sick man' of South Asia now. But I like to ask him a simple question whether and why Pakistan's longstanding rival (India as a 'healthy man') will at all times come in a race to keep this sick man healthy. In this connection, he defines the word 'emerging' as a geographic entity (a country or a region) that has achieved political stability, social steadiness in addition to economic dynamism for a road towards its sustainable future. But he does not consider that this term could properly be related to any of the South Asian countries except India. In short, he poses the questions whether India's growth will be sustained and whether South Asia as a whole is emerging in a much more real sense. In opposition to these unconfident and downhearted thoughts, I (likewise many involved analysts and futurists) can posit a number of sanguine and reasonable opinions in favor of the SAARC. If we go into detail, the SAARC earlier dubbed as a 'poor countries' club' is currently walking up to redefine itself as a group of powerful and booming economies. As the time has changed and things have evolved over time in the world, so has the SAARC. The gravity of SAARC can be measured by the viabilities that it has so far become part of every locus of major global decision-making either as a participant or as an observer. As of now, all the global great powers are not only the observers to the SAARC but also they have incorporated the South Asian region in their strategic plans. However, although the researcher stresses the growing impact of South Asia's demographic

change thanks to this region's well over one fifth of the world's population on the global economy, he misses to trace that the world will add nearly 4 billion people (with 1 billion plus population of India alone) into its middle-class during the next decade with the fastest-expanding market that is shifting to the South Asian region at present. Needless to say, such a buying capacity-driven consumer market growth will attract many multinational corporations (MNCs) with their corporate social responsibilities (CSR) not just their amazing amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) with fresh marketing strategies. In addition, the writer himself identifies a number of ravishing potentials of South Asia as this region is set to design its better tomorrow, even though global warming has created some adversities for it, the scope of which differs from other parts of the globe. He evinces that the location of this sub-continent due to its large landmass (but somewhat smaller than a continent) on the physical world's fringes, which is endowed with huge hydrocarbon resources, has generated possibilities for a gradually energyshortening world today. As he is also hopeful, South Asia's colonial experience under the British empire has left the SAARC member countries with a good working skills and abilities in English, which is the most dominating language in the universe not only to better help harness the competitive opportunities of the globalization process itself but also to interact with other states in Asia and the world as a whole. Very briefly, neither South Asia is any longer a region nor the SAARC is any more a regional bloc that can merely be neglected.

India's Leadership in Question

Getting to the point, the author develops one of the main messages of this volume, ie, the role of India in playing to shape South Asia's economic future. But he is simultaneously worried that it might be exceedingly difficult for India because of South Asia's troubled history to take the lead for nourishing a regional outlook to replace the country-centric approach in place today, and firmly re-position the region in the changing world order. As he also believes, some of the SAARC's smaller countries might deeply be fearful about the superpower stature of India as their neighbor and therefore will not be too ready to accept Indian leadership in organizing South Asia. Like many other phrases (as mentioned before), any clarification about the term 'leadership' is not given. But it is essential for us to know why and how India as a more operative state should/could shoulder its genuinely trustworthy and answerable role in leading South Asia not only to create a politically functional region but also to capture a reasonable amount of economic space for this region itself in the emerging global governance paradigm in such a manner as to achieve a desired result from now on. Even though the book's originator underlines the urgency for India's leadership for South Asia, he is at the same instant diffident that India might be tempted to go it alone. But he rightly maintains that this might not be possible for New Delhi, as India would

get constantly distracted from instability somewhere around its periphery.

Another most recurrent theme of the study is that South Asians would need to find a leader (or leaders) from within their own structure what happened in the case of some of the world's most successful regional blocs, such as the European Union (EU). However, he hesitates that if India could (or would not) perform this role for political reasons, the region might seek the involvement of another state as a catalyst. He prescribes a list of four possible catalysts (the US, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia) outside South Asia. He envisages that any of these four countries, which has a strong strategic interest in this region and is in favor of behaving a regional approach to guide its relations with the rest of the world, might be cast in such leadership role in South Asia. To me, as he remarks, it should not be a concern whether the smaller countries (such as the Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal) might welcome their intervention or India might be unwilling to countenance the presence of any of these external players on the South Asian stage. Rather, he should have more convincingly proposed how India, by fighting shy of New Delhi's orthodox and distorted belief besides inward-looking attitude that the region is its 'sphere of growing clout or interest', could attentively nurture a genuinely congenial and convivial relationship with its bordering nations and accordingly work together with all of them to develop South Asia for the days to come. Even though the researcher regards that the four countries mentioned above could take part in regional activities without containing Indian ambitions in the region for diverse reasons, giving an ineliminable space for any of these seriously controversial protagonists as the most prominent figure for a real drama of South Asia is likely to be problematic in the long run. It is because we have most recently observed how the two military hegemonic powers (ie, the US with Saudi Arabia as its duteous partner and Russia with China as its strategic ally) have led to disrupt West Asia (also called the Middle East as the Persian Gulf) for their own geo-political interests or geo-economic benefits while regretfully helping inflate Syria's civil war, the world's worst man-made disaster of our time. About Saudi Arabia, the author has illogically graded this middle power with the US, China, Russia as great powers. In fact, other SAARC nations are more and more skeptical of China's especial favoritism for Pakistan, since it has intentionally systemized a free trade agreement (FTA) only with Pakistan.

Anyhow, while China as a 'rising star' of the global economy has been spotlighted throughout this volume, the writer has totally failed to notice some of the most important truisms related to Japan, and particularly the protracted official development assistance (ODA) contribution of this great global pacifist power to the national interest of each and every SAARC country over several decades as well as Tokyo's rapidly growing role in the South Asian region for the future. It is redundant to say that the notable visibility of this truly trusted friend of

Bangladesh in Dhaka's sustainable development paradigm ever beats the same of China. Evidently, Japan has many years ago underscored the geo-strategic weight of Bangladesh as a 'business hub' between SAARC and ASEAN. Additionally and seemingly, Bangladesh compared with Pakistan (and even India) enjoys a bargaining power to several occasions over the great powers inside/outside Asia. Perhaps, the author has a dearth of rigorous and punctilious academic knowledge on the Northeast Asian region, conceding that he has a long professional expertise on Latin America, another world continent that is geographically so far away from the Asian one.

This Pakistani writer further encourages that Pakistan due to its economy's size being only one-eighth of India's would have to change its stance from a competitor of India and become a collaborator with India as its large neighbor as well as well as this country's 'anchor economy' (accounting for 82 percent of total of South Asian product) in many economic fields, mainly trade. On the other hand, as he recommends, India has to realize that it can only gain the status of an economic superpower if it earnestly works with the countries in its immediate neighborhood. As he proceeds, when making the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) an efficacious organization is vitally urgent, India should not be tempted to leapfrog the smaller members of the SAARC to form distant associations with such group as the EU, because no large economy has succeeded without first developing strong regional institutions. As per him, greater intra-regional trade in South Asia would have a palpable effect on the fabric of the smaller countries, as they enhanced links with large enterprises in India. Although I agree with all of his rational points above, I am not satisfied with his assessments on the plausible impact on the rates of growth of South Asia as an outcome of its action as a region than a collection of countries that occur to occupy the same geographic space. It is because he shares with other economists who developed several conjectural predictions for South Asia's future growth scenarios with or without economic integration in the book's concluding chapter, rather than assuredly putting forward with some realistic counsels.

More explicitly, he in his book's 'Prologue' (p. 7) asks the following questions: Given the situation of South Asia today, what will this region's future look like? What could we posit for South Asia, say, in the next 10 to 15 years? His initial assumption is that the South Asian inter-state conflict will continue to define this region's landscape, if such a condition becomes apparent. On the contrary, he in the same part interrogates: If the South Asians get to work together, what kind of future could they produce for themselves by, say, the year 2025? He forecasts that, in between these two scenarios, the SAARC countries would continue to take advantage of the rapidly transitioning economic position of East Asia (strikingly China) in the global economy but are still not able to work in tandem. In

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such a way, individual South Asian countries will become the partners of 'emerging Asia'. Bu, it is indubitable that many of the most illustrious predictions have spectacularly been proven misrepresented and flawed. For example: How will he evaluate his personal thinking about India's emergence to a limited extent in opposition to the popular divination that the 21st century will foreseeably be controlled by India?

Bangladesh as a 'Role Model'

When it comes to Bangladesh as a specific case, although the author admits that three countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) would have critical roles for SAARC in reshaping the world economy, he in his volume pinpoints the last two that have a long record of deep-seated mistrust and hostility. Even though he treats Bangladesh as one of the SAARC's most abominable examples of the state weakness caused heavily by substandard governance that will eventually result in considerable uncertainty about this country's bright tomorrow, he unfolds some of the most recent signs of Bangladesh's durable economic growth. As he cites, this nation's rate of steady gross domestic product (GDP) growth has averaged 5 percent a year over the last decade. But Bangladesh's economy recorded the highest GDP growth (8.2 percent) in Asia in fiscal 2018-2019. To quote him: "In many ways Bangladesh has surprised the international community. At the time of its birth in December 1971, it was dependent entirely on foreign assistance for its survival. The then United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called the new country an international basket case. Now it is the second best performing country in South Asia after India" (p. 168). Given that Bangladesh is already set to surpass India in terms of per capita GDP, this country is currently trying to catch up with India in economic indicators as well. Anyway, he continues to admire: "Bangladesh's remarkable economic and social progress was the result of a set of circumstances entirely different from those of India and Pakistan, the two other large economies of South Asia" (p. 172). If these are the fact-based statements from the own perspective of the author as a Pakistani national, ie, Bangladesh's quality is higher than Pakistan when the former is doing better than the latter, it is clearly and contrarily his biased stance for more cynical negativism of Pakistan as against more genuine positivism of Bangladesh. Frankly, he has generalized all the South Asian countries (whether big, middle or small in size) rather than specializing a distinct nation like Bangladesh.

Therefore, a full-grown independent chapter on the comparative and heuristic case study on Bangladesh with his answers to my following questions might have made this volume a really lofty and useful piece for the readers: First: Is it not true that Bangladesh owing to its reasonably well-done successes has portended its resilience even in the face of diverse political, social and economic hurdles spawned by both internal and external strains in the last 45 years and thereby

proved the then avowal of Kissinger fictitious, since Bangladesh is the second (after India) fastest growing economy within the SAARC? Second: Why is Pakistan lagging far behind Bangladesh in several economic sectors, consisting especially of the ready-made garment (RMG) that is the world's second (after China) biggest apparel exporting industry with the largest employer of women, although Pakistan has outshined Bangladesh as the second (after India) largest recipient of foreign remittances? Third: What lessons can the other SAARC states (Pakistan in particular) learn from Bangladesh whose economy has been listed among the 'Next 11' giants and termed as 'the miracle of the East' by Goldman Sachs (a leading global investment banking headquartered at New York in the US), recognizing that Bangladesh's economy is destined to overtake Pakistan's in 2020? Fourth: How can today's Bangladesh be definitely showcased for any country of South Asia and beyond this sub-region, just because this nation regardless of some constructive skepticisms has emerged as an example of not only natural disaster management and globally agreed sustainable development goals (SDGs) but also the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) in many conflictintensified zones throughout our real world? Fifth: Whether may Bangladesh's unique foreign policy pledge for 'Friendship with all and malice towards none' be well taken for peace-spirited cultural 'soft power' diplomacy by all kinds of powers worldwide, even though Dhaka's such a strategy was criticized in that this foreign aid-dependent country could not afford to antagonize any big power by joining other bloc(s)?

However, it is sad to say that Bangladesh remains a sharply 'divided nation' most ponderously from the viewpoint of varied self-limiting political dogmas on top of dirty politics with political culture gone extremely bad domestically against all of this nation's powerfully and mysteriously attractive potentials internationally. At the same time, this nation has unusually experienced frequent military interventions in its politics of self-destruction. Despite these facts, Bangladesh that is still struggling to become self-reliant and find its feet in a complex world order has already proven itself as a 'creative country' of which it can certainly feel proud. In sum, Bangladesh satisfyingly possesses abilities and qualities of a 'role model' nation not only from historical, strategic, diplomatic, financial, societal and cultural standpoints but also from local, bilateral, trilateral, regional, multilateral and global perspectives.

The Book's Negatives and Positives

Coming across that this book on account of its illusionary title evokes no admiration or inspiration, its makeup is in a mess. While lacking a conceptual underpinning, the research also does not think up any well-hypothesized argument or a focal point method. Visibly, the author posses a wide range of questions throughout the volume, which are not more convincingly answered as its ultimate

purpose. Besides, the publication has multiple oversights on what are actually the cases rather than interpretations of or reactions to them aside from some fanciful speculations without any firm evidence. It is undeniable that he offers a few worthwhile suggestions as well as future directions, but these are haphazardly misplaced in each chapter. In accordance, a complete chapter together with all these concrete proposals might have conveniently been helpful for the audiences, judging candidly that the study does not include any chapter on conclusion. In other words, the writer could not and did not come up with an integrated decision based on all chapters. In addition, he has shown his inclination for some nations or against others, when it has become apparent that the volume deals basically with economics as the basis of cooperation. Discovering that the long list of references (a few of which with erratic style) does not incorporate any work in any language of any South Asian country, it has some too old references published in the 1920s. For grammatical errors, omission of commas as punctuation marks everywhere in the book might be a particular problem for the readers. What is more, many parts of the book's every chapter are in the form of descriptive chronicles. In a nutshell, this volume cannot be ranked as a sedulous research with the highest level of intellectual stimulation.

Granted that some upfront cynicisms do matter for beneficial utilization, this single-authored book deserves a number of credits. Of course, this work brings together several strands of thinking aligned with the current perplexing but heartening situations in South Asia. More categorically, the author does not conventionally contemplate the negative aspects of South Asian historical experience of nation-building. I agree with his views as follows: "To take advantage of the opportunities that are being created is, therefore, a major challenge for the leaders of South Asia. If they can overcome their prejudices and cast off the heavy burdens that history has left on their shoulders they will be able to ensure a better life for their billion-and-a-half people. If they fail, they will only prolong the misery in which more than one-half of this large population lives" (p. 7). In other expressions, by bringing a drastic change in the old mindsets that are built on a difficult collective history as well as without jeopardizing the business partnership deals, the South Asian political leaders would have to make a concerted initiative not only to synchronically develop a regional identity as against strong national interests but also to synergistically integrate the deserving regional economies for getting ripple benefits for their individual nations while carving out a place for their SAARC within the dramatically changing international economic trading system in the commonly projected 'Asian century'. According to him, in search of a humanistic and welfare state-oriented South Asia, a permanent set of institutions in place of the safety nets on temporary basis is a must for the states of this region to protect and provide for the poor. But he infers that albeit the SAARC survived, it did not triumph as envisaged.

My Key Views and Counsels

In line with the writer's responsible advice, I would however like to supplement my personal thoughts and recommendations as follows. The lives of millions of ordinary people around South Asia depend largely on their political leaders' art of giving noble desires. Many of these purblind leaders must be aware of the ironic reality that South Asia (including India) has more than 40 percent of the world's poor, and the income disparities in this region are one of the globe's largest. So, they should make the SAARC 'reliably sensible' and 'symbolically ambitious' for the less fortunate population rather than repeatedly making this regional grouping a rhetorical mechanism, even though South Asian nations pursue different political ideologies. By learning invaluable lessons from other regions of Asia and beyond, the SAARC countries would also have to unitedly (not separately) act now on their own (rather than largely relying on mercy of any external power) to bring about a paradigmatic transformation across this long trivialized region, when providing a visionary leadership in a rightful way that will take their region there where poverty is discerned as a historical feature, peace for every human being is secured as well as success will be a phenomenon of everyday life's dynamic process. By unlocking the political gridlock and creating viable governance system within all nations in the region, they ought to march forward.

In particular, India and Pakistan must be able to imagine that their bilateral strategic quarrels have not only made the SAARC dysfunctional but also made the whole SAARC region vulnerable to stability, peace as well as prosperity. More harshly but honestly, India and Pakistan should not participate in the nuclear arms race competition for each nation's supremacy in regional warfare. Instead, these two ever rivals must vindicate their contention by eagerly involving themselves in fighting the persistent hunger surviving millions of their population. Even supposing, it is hunger as a lack of 'sufficient' food (let alone 'nutritious' food) that fundamentally causes undermalnutrition made up of various health diseases, when, according to a report by the WHO (World Health Organization, 2019), about half of deaths of children under the age of five years actually occur in five countries across Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Southern Asia, and only India and Pakistan from the latter region are dismally listed among these five victims. More specifically, as the findings of a recent survey of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNI-CEF) (Times of India, 2015) warn, India alone accounts for the highest number (22% percent) of the total under-five children death from malnutrition globally, although it is tagged to a coalition of the world's rising powers.

In essence, a culturally rich South Asia by virtue of its vibrant civil society must try its best in unison to make itself thoroughly familiar with and be adroitly dauntless in an emerging multilateral global order. Irrefutably, the SAARC na-

tions were able to turn themselves into 'emerging economies' of a modern day miracle from 'unbending victims' of a colonial day injustice. With its massive diaspora worldwide, the masses of South Asia are today regarded as global citizens, and they with their marvellously meaningful actions have become part and parcel of an international community. But the industrialization and modernization of SAARC members ought now to be readily fostered to catch up with the newly industrialized economies (NIE) of Asia and elsewhere, by keeping step with the spirit of the 'rise of the rest' in the post-American world. This means that the SAARC should not move away from its original aim of and steadfast commitment in a cherished, appropriate and prepared course to bringing collective good for its people in a more developed South Asian region. Finally, I cannot but mention the following three very relevant and famous quotes as the words of wisdom made by two most influential leaders in the Indian subcontinent independence movement against the hegemonic rule under the British empire, the first two of which are stipulated for India and the third one is generally marked for all SAARC countries: (1) "India could not play an inferior role in the world, and it should either be a superpower or disappear" - Jawaharlal Nehru (People's Daily Online, 2009); (2) "One who serves his neighbor serves all the world" - Mahatma Gandhi (Shodhganga, Undated); and (3) "You must be the change you wish to see in the world" - Mahatma Gandhi (Brainy Quote, Undated).

Conclusion

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In the global publishing industry, there exist countless literary works realized by South Asian and non-Asian academics on both problems and prospects of South Asian economic cooperation and integration that are similar to the theme of this book. In contrast, I have for the first time read such a timely volume written in a panoramic fashion, which presents insights into South Asia's synergies with the international configuration, by particularly engaging the defined role of each individual country of this sub-region within Asia in the competitive global economy as well as its sensible response to the era of globalization. Because of its somewhat success in goals, this significant and pioneering work accomplished by a seasoned economist (unlike a traditional economist) who has a broadly diversified outlook on the global issues or affairs will definitely prove an enthralling reference for and contributive addition to wide-ranging involved and interested stakeholders including students, researchers and scholars apart from policymakers, professionals and activists in a number of fields covering South Asian studies, Asian policy studies, interdisciplinary global studies, international relations, political economy, multilateral governance, development cooperation, etc. Unmissably, I express my warm admiration to Bukri's indefatigable undertaking for this production and give my unrestricted approval for his cutting-edge volume.

Last but not the least, I firmly believe that all the publics, institutions and orga-

nizations that are immersed themselves in South Asia generally and Bangladesh particularly from the global milieu in the concurrent millennium would find this rigorously argued as well as completely methodized review piece of my scholarship not only originative, informative and authoritative but also penetrative, compulsive and constructive. Also, I take a chance to append that such a representative article-length book review with my vociferous comments and unprejudiced reflections thanks to the intellectual freedom of media-imprinted debates will of course be of great worth to its producer (Routledge, and especially its 'Contemporary South Asia Series'), which claims itself to be the world's biggest academic publisher within the areas of humanities and social sciences. It is obviously because this so-called most prestigious press still has many rooms for drastic change, idiosyncratic difference and performance improvement in its forthcoming intellectual endeavors. In a brief and markedly expressed manner, Routledge as well as other global scholarly and research book/journal publishers must come to reasonably understand that quality (not quantity) matters for higher education system in today's knowledge-driven globalizing world.

Bio

Monir Hossain Moni is presently a Research Professor and Head for the Program on Japan & Global Affairs under the Division of Asia & Globalized World for which he is also managing his leadership as Director of the Dhaka-located Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS), a distinctive, state-of-theart, progressive as well as amazing 'role model' independent think tank beyond national and regional boundaries. He is superbly qualified with his Bachelor and Masters degrees in Political Science conferred by University of Dhaka, a second Masters in Asian & International Relations achieved from Tokyo (Japan)-based Hitotsubashi University and a doctorate in Asian & International Studies earned from Waseda University in Tokyo under the Japanese Government MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) Scholarship program. Dr Moni's widely expanded academic expertise area encompasses global multi-disciplinary, cross-comparative and area-specific studies generally on Asia with his attentiveness on Northeast Asia focusing especially on Japan as a traditionally established power neighbored closely with China as a rapidly emerging power and South Korea as a dynamic middle power in the midst of the inter-relational, intra-regional and multilaterally-cooperative strategic, political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technological aspects of the 21st century's cosmic system of globalization as both change-maker and challenge-poser. However, his research ventures have long and largely dealt with Japan's ever-increasing and all-round sustainable development cooperation South Asia with special reference to Bangladesh. In line with his long research interest and specialty, he has substantially contributed original, masterful and thus universally efficacious pieces to

the frontline journals produced not only by all the globe's higher education largest publishers but also by many promising presses inside and outside Asia during recent years. Professor Moni, who is zestful in research, has long been a regular grantee of overseas funding from renowned foundations for completing a series of innovative research projects. This worldwide traveled individual has extensively publicized his research outcomes among curious audiences at numerous conferences and workshops as well. A winner of several scholarships and fellowships mostly accomplished in Japan as well as a recipient of highly recognized and prestigious prizes named after Japan's two most influential ex-prime ministers (Yasuhiro Nakasone and Masayoshi Ohira), Professor Moni has actually proved himself as one of the world's top-notch Japan-specialist intellectuals worthy of advanced studies on 'Global Asia'. This 'world citizen' attributable to his great venture-backed vigor while having a global mindset with testament of care and conscientiousness in his duties always endeavors to contrive a most-desired value for helping build a 'better planet' (ie, a truly poverty-free, prosperous and peaceful humankind) made up of a sustainable future that kindles stability, change and difference in the real sense.

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